...case," Mr. Justice Brennun, speaking for the Court, would gr> only this far : "Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an...percentage share of the relevant market and results in n significant increase in the concentration of firms in the market, is so inherently likely to lessen...

...proof of market structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive effects. Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an...increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of...

...firms 31 — falls squarely within the rule of Philadelphia Nat'l Bank against a consolidation that "produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share...increase in the concentration of firms in that market. * * * " 32 That merger, had it been allowed, would have produced a firm with 36% of the relevant market,...

...Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage •hare of the relevant market, and results in a significant...increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of...

...United State*. 370 US 343 (1962). In Philadelphia National Bank, the Court referred specifically to "a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant ma-- ket." 374 US 363 (1963). **"... where concentration Is gaining momentum in a market, we must be...

...industry, the Court held that the merger violated section 7, and further said: Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an...increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of...

...permitting a too-broad economic investigation," and therefore announced a simplified test of illegality: "A merger which produces a firm controlling an undue...increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of...

...Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 TJ. S. 665, 673 (1964) (HARLAN, J., dissenting), concludes that the merger "produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market," ante, at 366. Under the Bank Merger Act it is now settled that a court must engage in a two-step process...

...not hold that all bank mergers resulting in an "undue percentage share of the relevant market" and "in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market," 374 US, at 363, necessarily violated § 7 of the Clayton Act. Instead that case established a rule...

...industry, the Court held that the merger violated section 7, and further said: Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an...increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of...