 | Ohio. Supreme Court - 1884 - 792 páginas
...defendant in error that the surety here falls within the rule, "Whenever one of two innocent parties must suffer by the act of a third, he who has enabled such person to occasion .the loss must sustain it." The application of this rule to the unauthorized alteration... | |
 | Indiana. Supreme Court, Horace E. Carter, Albert Gallatin Porter, Gordon Tanner, Benjamin Harrison, Michael Crawford Kerr, James Buckley Black, Augustus Newton Martin, Francis Marion Dice, John Worth Kern, John Lewis Griffiths, Sidney Romelee Moon, Charles Frederick Remy - 1874 - 672 páginas
...purchaser for value, for the want of delivery ; nor was the maker liable on the ground that when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third,...third person to occasion the loss must sustain it. Cline v. Gutltrie, 227 6. Individual Signature. — Not: of Corporation. — A promissory note was... | |
 | 1874 - 778 páginas
...familiar to the profession, and that is, whenever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it. The great principle of the law of estoppel is, that when an act is done or a statement made by a party... | |
 | Sir John Barnard Byles - 1874 - 860 páginas
...man.(e) " For it is a general rule, that where one of two innocent persons must suffer from the acts of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain \t."(f) And supposing the equity of the loser and payer precisely equal, there is no reason why the... | |
 | California. Supreme Court - 1875 - 758 páginas
...another's loss must lose." In Lickbarrow v. Mason, (2 TB 70,) Mr. Justice ASHURST said : "Wherever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he who enabled such third person to occasion the loss must bear it." But great caution should be exercised... | |
 | Great Britain. High Court of Justice. Common Pleas Division - 1876 - 850 páginas
...be decided according to the rule that, whenever one of two innocent parties must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it. This rule is a well-known rule both at law and in equity; but it is one by no means easy of application,... | |
 | Charles Patrick Daly - 1876 - 626 páginas
...Justice Ashnrst, in Lickbarrow v. Mason (2 Term E. 63), " that whenever one of two innocent persons may suffer by the act of a third, he who has enabled such person to occasion the loss must bear it ; " and C. J. Erie, in Ex parte Swan, supra, was of the opinion... | |
 | Utah. Supreme Court, Albert Hagan, John Augustine Marshall, John Maxcy Zane, James A. Williams, Joseph M. Tanner, George L. Nye, John Walcott Thompson, August B. Edler, Alonzo Blair Irvine, Harmel L. Pratt, William S. Dalton, H. Arnold Rich - 1910 - 688 páginas
...down as a "broad general principle that, wherever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it." The fact, therefore, that Con way did not have the securities in his possession at the time when the... | |
 | Utah. Supreme Court, Albert Hagan, John Augustine Marshall, John Maxcy Zane, James A. Williams, Joseph M. Tanner, George L. Nye, John Walcott Thompson, August B. Edler, Alonzo Blair Irvine, Harmel L. Pratt, William S. Dalton, H. Arnold Rich - 1912 - 686 páginas
...ignore the fundamental principle that, "wherever one of two innocent persons must 8 suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it." (16 Cyc. 773.) Tn saying what we have we arc not unmindful of the fact that dower is merely an inchoate... | |
 | 1877 - 558 páginas
...court observe: "The rule that ' whenever one of two innocent parties must suffer by the acts of the third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it,' is not applicable, for the reason that the indorserdid not, in any legal sense, enaf/le the maker to... | |
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We may lay it down as a broad general principle, that, wherever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it. 
