The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
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... zero 243.5 Dependent variable Canada [ 1911-1961 birth cohorts aged 25-64 in the 1971-2001 Censuses ] Number of years of schooling Minimum school - leaving age at age 14 0.130 [ 0.0154 ] *** Initial sample size 854,243 0.130 [ 0.0129 ] ...
... zero 243.5 Dependent variable Canada [ 1911-1961 birth cohorts aged 25-64 in the 1971-2001 Censuses ] Number of years of schooling Minimum school - leaving age at age 14 0.130 [ 0.0154 ] *** Initial sample size 854,243 0.130 [ 0.0129 ] ...
Página 283
B. Temperance We now add a second zero - mean random variable . Let ẽ , and 2 denote these two zero- mean random variables . We assume that ẽ , and 2 are statistically independent of each other as well as independent of other random ...
B. Temperance We now add a second zero - mean random variable . Let ẽ , and 2 denote these two zero- mean random variables . We assume that ẽ , and 2 are statistically independent of each other as well as independent of other random ...
Página 73
... zero . The incumbent commits to the rental path r ,, where t designates time , and receives a mar- ginal revenue of r , per line if the entrant decides to lease lines . The marginal cost of the loops is constant and is normalized to zero ...
... zero . The incumbent commits to the rental path r ,, where t designates time , and receives a mar- ginal revenue of r , per line if the entrant decides to lease lines . The marginal cost of the loops is constant and is normalized to zero ...
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advertising agents aggregate allocation Angrist assume assumption average search success B-type bank behavior birth cohort cartel cash choice coefficients column condition consumer consumer surplus coordination deposits distribution of managerial effects efficiency equation equilibrium estimates evaluate expected firm fraction growth hiring Hispanic implies increase industry inequality inflation instrumental variables interest rate investments Journal of Economic labor late projects loan sanctions lobby lung cancer managerial expertise managers marginal ment monetary policy mortality rate motorists newspaper circulation nomic nominal nominal deposits nominal interest rate odious debt optimal outcomes output p-values paper Pareto improving percent period population race race-r racial prejudice regime regression risk sample school-leaving age search cost search success rates skill social statistical sumer surplus Table technology shock tion trade troopers utility variables wage wealth workers zero