The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
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... Trade and Loan Sanctions In this section we first argue that cutting off dictators from either trade or lending could de- ter at least some dictators from taking power . We then show that firms have an incentive to break trade sanctions ...
... Trade and Loan Sanctions In this section we first argue that cutting off dictators from either trade or lending could de- ter at least some dictators from taking power . We then show that firms have an incentive to break trade sanctions ...
Página 405
... trade unions , often lobby for trade protection . For example , U.S. trade unions strongly opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) in the 1990s because of fears that freer trade would decrease domestic employment and ...
... trade unions , often lobby for trade protection . For example , U.S. trade unions strongly opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) in the 1990s because of fears that freer trade would decrease domestic employment and ...
Página 406
... trade union does not , because workers receive part of the protection rents . Moreover , as long as trade protection increases the wages of at least some nonunionized work- ers , equilibrium protection is lower than in the GH model ...
... trade union does not , because workers receive part of the protection rents . Moreover , as long as trade protection increases the wages of at least some nonunionized work- ers , equilibrium protection is lower than in the GH model ...
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advertising agents aggregate allocation Angrist assume assumption average search success B-type bank behavior birth cohort cartel cash choice coefficients column condition consumer consumer surplus coordination deposits distribution of managerial effects efficiency equation equilibrium estimates evaluate expected firm fraction growth hiring Hispanic implies increase industry inequality inflation instrumental variables interest rate investments Journal of Economic labor late projects loan sanctions lobby lung cancer managerial expertise managers marginal ment monetary policy mortality rate motorists newspaper circulation nomic nominal nominal deposits nominal interest rate odious debt optimal outcomes output p-values paper Pareto improving percent period population race race-r racial prejudice regime regression risk sample school-leaving age search cost search success rates skill social statistical sumer surplus Table technology shock tion trade troopers utility variables wage wealth workers zero