The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
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Página 107
... equilibrium reach with the op- timum one . Equilibrium reach is determined by equating profit per consumer with the cost of reaching an extra consumer , whereas the opti- mum equates social surplus per consumer to the cost . The equilibrium ...
... equilibrium reach with the op- timum one . Equilibrium reach is determined by equating profit per consumer with the cost of reaching an extra consumer , whereas the opti- mum equates social surplus per consumer to the cost . The equilibrium ...
Página 264
... equilibrium path . We employ a version of the Cho - Kreps intuitive criterion to rule these out . The second source of multiplicity arises from the possibility that the planner may discriminate between signals that are identical from ...
... equilibrium path . We employ a version of the Cho - Kreps intuitive criterion to rule these out . The second source of multiplicity arises from the possibility that the planner may discriminate between signals that are identical from ...
Página 386
... equilibrium ratio of m , to rate й = n , needs to satisfy ( 2 ) A. Analysis and Results The value of being unemployed is given by where rU = b + αw0Sm b = b + b ره 0 F ( k ) dk increases the standard unemployment compen- sation b to b ...
... equilibrium ratio of m , to rate й = n , needs to satisfy ( 2 ) A. Analysis and Results The value of being unemployed is given by where rU = b + αw0Sm b = b + b ره 0 F ( k ) dk increases the standard unemployment compen- sation b to b ...
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advertising agents aggregate allocation Angrist assume assumption average search success B-type bank behavior birth cohort cartel cash choice coefficients column condition consumer consumer surplus coordination deposits distribution of managerial effects efficiency equation equilibrium estimates evaluate expected firm fraction growth hiring Hispanic implies increase industry inequality inflation instrumental variables interest rate investments Journal of Economic labor late projects loan sanctions lobby lung cancer managerial expertise managers marginal ment monetary policy mortality rate motorists newspaper circulation nomic nominal nominal deposits nominal interest rate odious debt optimal outcomes output p-values paper Pareto improving percent period population race race-r racial prejudice regime regression risk sample school-leaving age search cost search success rates skill social statistical sumer surplus Table technology shock tion trade troopers utility variables wage wealth workers zero