The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
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Página 96
... consumer is willing to pay more than marginal cost for the product . Since the consumers and the firm have identical priors , we normalize , and to a single consumer . We suppose that the " haz- ard rate " f / ( 1 - F ) is strictly ...
... consumer is willing to pay more than marginal cost for the product . Since the consumers and the firm have identical priors , we normalize , and to a single consumer . We suppose that the " haz- ard rate " f / ( 1 - F ) is strictly ...
Página 97
... consumer will not search and there will be no market for the good : this case when the market unravels is effectively the one noted by Joseph E. Stiglitz ( 1979 ) . The firm then needs to ad- vertise ( either a low price or some match ...
... consumer will not search and there will be no market for the good : this case when the market unravels is effectively the one noted by Joseph E. Stiglitz ( 1979 ) . The firm then needs to ad- vertise ( either a low price or some match ...
Página 109
... consumer as to her precise valuation . Message credibility requires that any advertising choice ought to be an equilibrium choice for all product types that are purported to be making that choice ( i.e. , the product types should be ...
... consumer as to her precise valuation . Message credibility requires that any advertising choice ought to be an equilibrium choice for all product types that are purported to be making that choice ( i.e. , the product types should be ...
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advertising agents aggregate allocation Angrist assume assumption average search success B-type bank behavior birth cohort cartel cash choice coefficients column condition consumer consumer surplus coordination deposits distribution of managerial effects efficiency equation equilibrium estimates evaluate expected firm fraction growth hiring Hispanic implies increase industry inequality inflation instrumental variables interest rate investments Journal of Economic labor late projects loan sanctions lobby lung cancer managerial expertise managers marginal ment monetary policy mortality rate motorists newspaper circulation nomic nominal nominal deposits nominal interest rate odious debt optimal outcomes output p-values paper Pareto improving percent period population race race-r racial prejudice regime regression risk sample school-leaving age search cost search success rates skill social statistical sumer surplus Table technology shock tion trade troopers utility variables wage wealth workers zero