The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
No interior do livro
Resultados 1-3 de 80
Página 119
... condition , all players handed in slips of paper ( nonparticipants checked a box indicating they were not playing ) . In the no - history condition , subjects knew the participant number of subjects 3 to 12 since they entered the room ...
... condition , all players handed in slips of paper ( nonparticipants checked a box indicating they were not playing ) . In the no - history condition , subjects knew the participant number of subjects 3 to 12 since they entered the room ...
Página 124
... conditions ( 13 of 60 in the control ; 35 of 36 in no history ; 33 of 108 in history ) , but was clearly highest in the no- history condition . While the proportion was higher for history sessions than for the control , this is not ...
... conditions ( 13 of 60 in the control ; 35 of 36 in no history ; 33 of 108 in history ) , but was clearly highest in the no- history condition . While the proportion was higher for history sessions than for the control , this is not ...
Página 449
... condition is very likely to be violated . If the condition is violated , more transparency is good , and not bad , for social welfare in this model . = First , we note , as did Morris and Shin , that for condition ( 6 ) to hold , the ...
... condition is very likely to be violated . If the condition is violated , more transparency is good , and not bad , for social welfare in this model . = First , we note , as did Morris and Shin , that for condition ( 6 ) to hold , the ...
Outras edições - Ver tudo
Palavras e frases frequentes
advertising agents aggregate allocation Angrist assume assumption average search success B-type bank behavior birth cohort cartel cash choice coefficients column condition consumer consumer surplus coordination deposits distribution of managerial effects efficiency equation equilibrium estimates evaluate expected firm fraction growth hiring Hispanic implies increase industry inequality inflation instrumental variables interest rate investments Journal of Economic labor late projects loan sanctions lobby lung cancer managerial expertise managers marginal ment monetary policy mortality rate motorists newspaper circulation nomic nominal nominal deposits nominal interest rate odious debt optimal outcomes output p-values paper Pareto improving percent period population race race-r racial prejudice regime regression risk sample school-leaving age search cost search success rates skill social statistical sumer surplus Table technology shock tion trade troopers utility variables wage wealth workers zero