| United States. Department of State. Historical Division - 1955 - 1136 páginas
...geography and particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean and exert it decisively upon the continent — we might be able to successfully...agreement on such matters as between the British and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in starting a train of events that... | |
| United States. Department of State - 1955 - 448 páginas
...geography and particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean and exert it decisively upon the continent — we might be able to successfully...agreement on such matters as between the British and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF starting... | |
| United States. Department of State. Historical Office - 1960 - 1226 páginas
...geography and particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean and exert it decisively upon the continent — we might be able to successfully...agreement on such matters as between the British and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in starting a train of events that... | |
| United States. Department of State. Historical Office - 1960 - 1230 páginas
...geography and particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean and exert it decisively upon the continent — we might be able to successfully...any agreement on such matters as between the British [No. 224] GENERAL BACKGROUND REPORTS and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result... | |
| United States. Congress. House. Foreign Affirs - 1971 - 240 páginas
...(the only conflict which the JCS, in its wisdom, could then glimpse "in the foreseeable future" was between Britain and Russia). ". . . would seem to...disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary." The Americans were perfectly ready to acknowledge that Russia was entitled to convincing assurance... | |
| United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe - 1971 - 248 páginas
...(the only conflict which the JCS, in it's wisdom, could then glimpse "in the foreseeable future" was between Britain and Russia). ". . . would seem to...disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary." The Americans were perfectly ready to acknowledge that Russia was entitled to convincing assurance... | |
| United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs - 1971 - 1358 páginas
..."in the foreseeable future" was between Britain and Russia), ". . . would seem to grow out of eilher nation initiating attempts to build up its strength,...disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary." The Americans were perfectly ready to acknowledge that Russia was entitled to convincing assurance... | |
| Erik Peter Hoffmann, Frederic J. Fleron - 778 páginas
...(the only conflict which the JCS, in its wisdom, could then glimpse "in the foreseeable future" was between Britain and Russia), "... would seem to grow...disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary." The Americans were perfectly ready to acknowledge that Russia was entitled to convincing assurance... | |
| James F. Schnabel - 1996 - 264 páginas
...postwar era, in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lay in either the USSR or Great Britain "seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the...disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary. "' On 3 August 1944, in connection with consideration of the proposed international organization of... | |
| Andrew H. Kydd - 2005 - 316 páginas
...Admiral William Leahy in May of 1944 also analyzed British-Soviet relations as a security dilemma: "The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between...disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary" and urged that US policy should be to promote Anglo-Russian cooperation (FRUS Yalta: 108). Averell... | |
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