The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 680
... Rounds 11-15 1.427 *** 1.505 *** 1.249 *** 1.244 *** * B = 10 ( 0.336 ) ( 0.373 ) ( 0.227 ) ( 0.212 ) Rounds 11-15 1.470 *** 1.575 *** 1.266 ** 2.157 *** * B = 14 ( 0.311 ) ( 0.345 ) ( 0.246 ) Rounds 16-20 -0.052 -0.103 -0.404 ...
... Rounds 11-15 1.427 *** 1.505 *** 1.249 *** 1.244 *** * B = 10 ( 0.336 ) ( 0.373 ) ( 0.227 ) ( 0.212 ) Rounds 11-15 1.470 *** 1.575 *** 1.266 ** 2.157 *** * B = 14 ( 0.311 ) ( 0.345 ) ( 0.246 ) Rounds 16-20 -0.052 -0.103 -0.404 ...
Página 681
... Rounds 1-10 ( B = 6 ) round 29 as in round 20.26 Among the nine firms that see changes , six see changes of at least two effort levels . The relatively good per- formance of firms that have their bonus reduced back to B = 6 is almost ...
... Rounds 1-10 ( B = 6 ) round 29 as in round 20.26 Among the nine firms that see changes , six see changes of at least two effort levels . The relatively good per- formance of firms that have their bonus reduced back to B = 6 is almost ...
Página 682
... ROUNDS 6-10 AND 21-30 Random effect 3.491 *** 1.824 *** 3.750 *** 3.557 *** Rounds Following Increase FIGURE 3. EFFECT OF TIMING , CHANGE. Data type Firm - level data minimum effort Employee - level data effort Controls for individual ...
... ROUNDS 6-10 AND 21-30 Random effect 3.491 *** 1.824 *** 3.750 *** 3.557 *** Rounds Following Increase FIGURE 3. EFFECT OF TIMING , CHANGE. Data type Firm - level data minimum effort Employee - level data effort Controls for individual ...
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5 | 720 |
MAYORG AND MARCH | 989 |
This Appendix explains in more detail | 1232 |
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking social security standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero