The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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... positive probability in any Nash equilibrium where 1 drops , so the same is true for the more restrictive concept of subgame - confirmed equilibrium . Now consider the subgame starting with player 2's move . If 2 passes with positive ...
... positive probability in any Nash equilibrium where 1 drops , so the same is true for the more restrictive concept of subgame - confirmed equilibrium . Now consider the subgame starting with player 2's move . If 2 passes with positive ...
Página 947
... positive correlation test , we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation . Proper implementation of the positive corre- lation test requires that we examine insurance demand among individuals who face the same set of ...
... positive correlation test , we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation . Proper implementation of the positive corre- lation test requires that we examine insurance demand among individuals who face the same set of ...
Página 955
... positive correlation " property Issue age category Age 60 ( omitted ) Age 60-64 1.199 *** ( 0.423 ) 1.039 ** ( 0.505 ) ... Positive 0.233 ( 0.238 ) 0.312 ( 0.268 ) Positive and larger than 20 - day deductible coefficient on 60 - day ...
... positive correlation " property Issue age category Age 60 ( omitted ) Age 60-64 1.199 *** ( 0.423 ) 1.039 ** ( 0.505 ) ... Positive 0.233 ( 0.238 ) 0.312 ( 0.268 ) Positive and larger than 20 - day deductible coefficient on 60 - day ...
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5 | 720 |
MAYORG AND MARCH | 989 |
This Appendix explains in more detail | 1232 |
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking social security standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero