The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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... players who do no experimen- tation at all . Thus it imposes only the restriction that players learn what happens on the equilib- rium path . DEFINITION 3.1 : 0 is a self - confirming equi- librium if for each player i and for each Si ...
... players who do no experimen- tation at all . Thus it imposes only the restriction that players learn what happens on the equilib- rium path . DEFINITION 3.1 : 0 is a self - confirming equi- librium if for each player i and for each Si ...
Página 635
thinks the next player is going do so , and drop if he thinks the next player is going to drop . ( 2,2,2 ) pass 3 drop ( 0,0,1 ) pass 2 drop ( 0,1,0 ) pass 1 drop → ( 1,0,0 ) The unique subgame - perfect equilibrium is clearly for all ...
thinks the next player is going do so , and drop if he thinks the next player is going to drop . ( 2,2,2 ) pass 3 drop ( 0,0,1 ) pass 2 drop ( 0,1,0 ) pass 1 drop → ( 1,0,0 ) The unique subgame - perfect equilibrium is clearly for all ...
Página 1033
riod players were rematched with another partner . Players were assigned to one of the three experimental conditions ( deterministic , probabilistic , or deterministic payoffs with sunspots ) . We ran five sessions in the deter ...
riod players were rematched with another partner . Players were assigned to one of the three experimental conditions ( deterministic , probabilistic , or deterministic payoffs with sunspots ) . We ran five sessions in the deter ...
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5 | 720 |
MAYORG AND MARCH | 989 |
This Appendix explains in more detail | 1232 |
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking social security standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero