The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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... ment and a forward - looking variable . The middle panel of Figure 2 compares the behavior of aggregate I / K and aggregate QF , our market - based measure of average q . In contrast to the results in the top panel , I / K and Q are ...
... ment and a forward - looking variable . The middle panel of Figure 2 compares the behavior of aggregate I / K and aggregate QF , our market - based measure of average q . In contrast to the results in the top panel , I / K and Q are ...
Página 888
... ment chooses whether to challenge the subsidy under the SCM Agree- ment . If the subsidy is challenged , then s = 1 , and the home govern- ment may choose again its domes- tic tax î . Stage 4 : If the conditions for an NV claim are met ...
... ment chooses whether to challenge the subsidy under the SCM Agree- ment . If the subsidy is challenged , then s = 1 , and the home govern- ment may choose again its domes- tic tax î . Stage 4 : If the conditions for an NV claim are met ...
Página 964
... ment decisions of high - school graduates can be seen as solutions to a simplified version of a human capital investment model . The maximi- zation of the discounted present value of life- time earnings , net of education costs ...
... ment decisions of high - school graduates can be seen as solutions to a simplified version of a human capital investment model . The maximi- zation of the discounted present value of life- time earnings , net of education costs ...
Índice
5 | 720 |
MAYORG AND MARCH | 989 |
This Appendix explains in more detail | 1232 |
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking social security standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero