The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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... increase matter or is the simple fact of an increase effective as such ? ( 3 ) If an increase in the bonus rate brings about im- proved coordination , can the bonus rate increase be revoked without affecting the improved out- come ? ( 4 ) ...
... increase matter or is the simple fact of an increase effective as such ? ( 3 ) If an increase in the bonus rate brings about im- proved coordination , can the bonus rate increase be revoked without affecting the improved out- come ? ( 4 ) ...
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... increase . There is a clear relationship between the number of strong leaders and av- erage effort levels - the more employees who respond strongly to the bonus rate increase in round 11 , the higher the firm's minimum effort ( on ...
... increase . There is a clear relationship between the number of strong leaders and av- erage effort levels - the more employees who respond strongly to the bonus rate increase in round 11 , the higher the firm's minimum effort ( on ...
Página 683
... Increase ( Firm ) Late Increase ( Firm ) Early Increase ( Employee ) 10 Late Increase ( Employee ) = an increase may be important . This leads to our final question : Given the presence of hystere- sis , is it harder to turn around a ...
... Increase ( Firm ) Late Increase ( Firm ) Early Increase ( Employee ) 10 Late Increase ( Employee ) = an increase may be important . This leads to our final question : Given the presence of hystere- sis , is it harder to turn around a ...
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5 | 720 |
MAYORG AND MARCH | 989 |
This Appendix explains in more detail | 1232 |
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking social security standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero