The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 633
→ H is denoted u ; Z R. We let U max¿.z.z ' \ u1 ( z ) — u , ( z ' ) ] denote the largest differ- ence in utility levels . - i Let A denote the space of probability dis- tributions over a set . Then a mixed strategy profile is σ E XA ...
→ H is denoted u ; Z R. We let U max¿.z.z ' \ u1 ( z ) — u , ( z ' ) ] denote the largest differ- ence in utility levels . - i Let A denote the space of probability dis- tributions over a set . Then a mixed strategy profile is σ E XA ...
Página 798
... denote the potential measurement error from using the stock market to proxy for intrinsic value , equation ( 2 ) becomes 1 ( 3 ) ( 4 ) = a + α i , t i , t + b CF μί ・( 뜻 ) + ( 00- 뽕 ) . K i , t Εί b Our second proxy for the firm's ...
... denote the potential measurement error from using the stock market to proxy for intrinsic value , equation ( 2 ) becomes 1 ( 3 ) ( 4 ) = a + α i , t i , t + b CF μί ・( 뜻 ) + ( 00- 뽕 ) . K i , t Εί b Our second proxy for the firm's ...
Página 879
... denote one plus the ad valorem consumption tax imposed on con- sumption of good x in the home country ( so that t > 1 ( t < 1 ) reflects a consumption tax ( subsidy ) ) . We denote the domestic producer price of good x ( inclusive of ...
... denote one plus the ad valorem consumption tax imposed on con- sumption of good x in the home country ( so that t > 1 ( t < 1 ) reflects a consumption tax ( subsidy ) ) . We denote the domestic producer price of good x ( inclusive of ...
Índice
5 | 720 |
MAYORG AND MARCH | 989 |
This Appendix explains in more detail | 1232 |
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking social security standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero