Mind, Volume 77Oxford University Press, 1968 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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... thought . ” Now if I say that I thought that for a moment he was going to hit the umpire am I saying that what I thought really only describes a momentary occurrence or process ? I certainly do not say that “ He was going to hit the ...
... thought . ” Now if I say that I thought that for a moment he was going to hit the umpire am I saying that what I thought really only describes a momentary occurrence or process ? I certainly do not say that “ He was going to hit the ...
Página 3
... thought . " Now if I say that I thought that for a moment he was going to hit the umpire am I saying that what I thought really only describes a momentary occurrence or process ? I certainly do not say that " He was going to hit the ...
... thought . " Now if I say that I thought that for a moment he was going to hit the umpire am I saying that what I thought really only describes a momentary occurrence or process ? I certainly do not say that " He was going to hit the ...
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... thoughts , for the time of a momentary intention may be the time of a thought with which it is connected . For instance , " When I thought how mean he had been to George , for a moment I meant to lie to him " . The time of the thought ...
... thoughts , for the time of a momentary intention may be the time of a thought with which it is connected . For instance , " When I thought how mean he had been to George , for a moment I meant to lie to him " . The time of the thought ...
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accept affected analytic answer argue argument Aristotle Aristotle's assertion baked a cake behaviour believe belongs called claim concept conclusion conditional statement context cosmological argument criteria criterion definition discussion distinction entails example existence explain expression fact false figure syllogism finite finitist follows Form of Bed formal logic G. E. Moore given H. L. A. Hart inference intention interpretation Kelsen language legal duty Lucretius mathematical mathematical logic means mental images mind moral nature necessary norm notion object paradox particular person philosophical Plato position possible predicate premisses principle Prior Analytics problem proof proper name proposition question R. M. Hare reason reference regard relation relevant remember rule Russell's paradox Saladin sanction seems sense sentence simply singular someone sort Strawson suppose syllogistic syllogistic pair theory thesis thing Timaeus tion true truth unfulfilled conditional statement value judgment visualising words