Mind, Volume 77Oxford University Press, 1968 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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Página 187
... called off . One way of taking ( E5 ) makes it trivial ; -if nobody turned up then the game was called off . But if we read it with slight emphasis on ' one ' in ' at least one ' , then there is the possibility of a non - trivial ...
... called off . One way of taking ( E5 ) makes it trivial ; -if nobody turned up then the game was called off . But if we read it with slight emphasis on ' one ' in ' at least one ' , then there is the possibility of a non - trivial ...
Página 197
... called off . Which player ? Not the Rovers ' goalkeeper , for the Rovers ' centre half could play in goal . Not the ... called off , we assume ( 2 ) that the game was not called off , then ( 3 ) at least one player turned up . ( 4 ) We ...
... called off . Which player ? Not the Rovers ' goalkeeper , for the Rovers ' centre half could play in goal . Not the ... called off , we assume ( 2 ) that the game was not called off , then ( 3 ) at least one player turned up . ( 4 ) We ...
Página 576
... called " choosing " . Taking sherry when only sherry is offered is not called " choosing sherry " . It is also true that there is no action called " taking - the - sherry - rather - than - the - beer . " We say " He chose the sherry ...
... called " choosing " . Taking sherry when only sherry is offered is not called " choosing sherry " . It is also true that there is no action called " taking - the - sherry - rather - than - the - beer . " We say " He chose the sherry ...
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accept affected analytic answer argue argument Aristotle Aristotle's assertion baked a cake behaviour believe belongs called claim concept conclusion conditional statement context cosmological argument criteria criterion definition discussion distinction entails example existence explain expression fact false figure syllogism finite finitist follows Form of Bed formal logic G. E. Moore given H. L. A. Hart inference intention interpretation Kelsen language legal duty Lucretius mathematical mathematical logic means mental images mind moral nature necessary norm notion object paradox particular person philosophical Plato position possible predicate premisses principle Prior Analytics problem proof proper name proposition question R. M. Hare reason reference regard relation relevant remember rule Russell's paradox Saladin sanction seems sense sentence simply singular someone sort Strawson suppose syllogistic syllogistic pair theory thesis thing Timaeus tion true truth unfulfilled conditional statement value judgment visualising words