In support of this opinion, I would remark, in the first place, (for I must touch very slightly on the subject,) the advantage which all classes of men derive from a taste for books, considered merely as a resource, and without any regard to their practical effects on the concerns of their life, or on their speculative views. With respect to the higher orders of men, I presume this scarcely admits of a doubt. And yet it holds with still greater force, if possible, in the case of those who subsist by the labour of their hands. In almost every species of employment, a considerable part of every day must be devoted to bodily relaxation and repose; and unless some exercise or amusement be provided for the mind during these intervals of occupation, they will necessarily be filled up with intemperance and profligacy. The task of speculation is far beyond. the capacity of those who have not received the advantages of education, and indeed, is of all efforts the most painful, where the curiosity has not been excited and the faculties exercised in very early life. Such, at the same time, is the activity of nature, that a state of perfect lassitude and indolence is the completion of suffering, and seldom fails to suggest some expedient, however desperate, to remove its pressure. Hence the indolence and languor of the savage, when his bodily powers are unemployed, and hence that vacuity of thought which prompts him to rush into the agitations of gaming, or the delirium of intoxication.

All this will apply, more or less, to uncultivated minds in every state of society, and can be prevented only by those early habits of mental application, which render some degree of intellectual exertion a sort of want or necessary of life. Nor is it merely in this view that early instruction operates beneficially. Wherever the lower orders enjoy the benefits of education, they will be found to be comparatively sober and industrious; and in many instances, the establishment of a small library in the neighbourhood of a manufactory, has been known to produce a sensible and rapid improvement in the morals of the work people. The cultivation of mind, too, which books communicate, naturally inspires that desire and

hope of advancement, which, in all the classes of society, is the most steady and powerful motive to economy and industry. The book societies which have arisen in different parts of Scotland, England, and America, abundantly illustrate and confirm the truth of this observation.

It is not, however, merely as a resource against "the pains and penalties of idleness," that a taste for books and speculation is favourable to the morals and industry of the lower orders. The great source of that vice and misery which prevail among them, is to be found in their prejudices and speculative errors; and every addition which is made to the stock of human knowledge, has a tendency to augment their virtue and their happiness. The exceptions which seem to contradict the universality of this truth, would, I am persuaded, be found, upon examination, to be rather apparent than real. It cannot be disputed, that there are various prejudices, both political and moral, which seem to be favourable to the best interests of mankind, and which a philosopher who wishes well to the world, would touch with a very cautious and timorous hand. But in such cases it will always be found, that every prejudice derives its utility from some mixture which it involves of important truth. The truth probably was, in the first instance, suggested by its congeniality with the principles of human nature, and served to protect the prejudice. But frequently, this order of things comes to be reversed, and the prejudice has the appearance of being essentially necessary for the support of the truth. In instances of this kind, there is the utmost danger in attempting to loosen the foundations of established opinion, lest we should weaken the influence of what is true and salutary, in a greater proportion than we correct what is hurtful or erroneous, or, as it is expressed in the sacred. writings, "lest in pulling up the tares, we root up the wheat also." In acting, however, on this opinion, it is obvious that far from considering error as more useful to the world than truth, the deference which we find it expedient to pay to the former, is founded entirely on our conviction of the certain

blessings which are connected with the prevailing authority of the latter.

The progress made in Political Economy during the course of the last century, affords the most luminous illustration of the truth of some of the foregoing remarks. Every step which has hitherto been gained in that science, has discovered to the world some delusive project or erroneous opinion, counteracting human happiness, and even counteracting the partial interests of those by whom the project or opinion was fostered and encouraged. And in proportion as its general principles assume somewhat of a systematical form, the connexion between the interests of individuals and the national prosperity, and the still more unexpected connexion between the prosperity of nations and that of neighbouring communities, becomes more and more apparent. The whole of Mr. Smith's political writings, in particular, may be considered as a commentary on this great maxim, that in the case of nations, as well as of individuals, Honesty is the best and surest Policy; or what amounts nearly to the same thing, that while our inquiries are guided alone by a sense of justice, and by a dispassionate love of truth, our conclusions must be favourable to the best interests of mankind. Such speculations tend at once to enlarge the understanding, and to amend the heart, exhibiting a union and harmony among the principles of political speculation, while they add powerfully to the authority of virtue, and animate every worthy motive to exertion. They stimulate, more especially, our efforts to instruct and to enlighten the world, and by teaching us to regard the cause of truth and the welfare of our species as inseparably connected, they unite in checking the influence of those partial and mistaken conceptions of expediency which oppose so many obstacles to the progress of society. To those whose minds are familiarized to this view of human affairs, the following sentiments of an English divine,** equally distinguished by his learning and by the classical elegance of his style, will appear to be as just and profound * [Dr. Conyers Middleton. See Preface to his Works.]

as they are forcibly and beautifully expressed; and with this passage, which accords so completely with my own opinions, I shall now close this course of Lectures:*" I persuade myself, that the life and faculties of man, at the best but short and limited, cannot be employed more rationally or laudably, than in the search of knowledge, and especially of that sort which relates to our duty, and conduces to our happiness. I look upon the discovery of anything which is true, as a valuable acquisition to society, which cannot possibly hurt or obstruct the good effect of any other truth whatsoever, for they all partake of one common essence, and necessarily coincide with each other; and, like the drops of rain which fall separately into the river, mix themselves at once with the stream, and strengthen the general current.”—(End of interpolation from Notes.)

* [See footnotes on pp. 326, 351 of this volume, et alibi. In general, the reader will observe, that use has, more than once, been made of this Book of

the Political Economy, especially towards its close, in the Third Part of the Dissertation. (Works, Vol. I.)]