The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
No interior do livro
Resultados 1-3 de 88
Página 87
... Trade and Loan Sanctions In this section we first argue that cutting off dictators from either trade or lending could de- ter at least some dictators from taking power . We then show that firms have an incentive to break trade sanctions ...
... Trade and Loan Sanctions In this section we first argue that cutting off dictators from either trade or lending could de- ter at least some dictators from taking power . We then show that firms have an incentive to break trade sanctions ...
Página 405
... trade unions , often lobby for trade protection . For example , U.S. trade unions strongly opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) in the 1990s because of fears that freer trade would decrease domestic employment and ...
... trade unions , often lobby for trade protection . For example , U.S. trade unions strongly opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) in the 1990s because of fears that freer trade would decrease domestic employment and ...
Página 406
... trade union does not , because workers receive part of the protection rents . Moreover , as long as trade protection increases the wages of at least some nonunionized work- ers , equilibrium protection is lower than in the GH model ...
... trade union does not , because workers receive part of the protection rents . Moreover , as long as trade protection increases the wages of at least some nonunionized work- ers , equilibrium protection is lower than in the GH model ...
Índice
Free Markets and Fettered Consumers | 3 |
DOUGLAS W DIAMOND AND RAGHURAM G RAJAN | 30 |
CHRISTOPHER A SIMS AND TAO | 54 |
Direitos de autor | |
28 outras secções não apresentadas
Outras edições - Ver tudo
Palavras e frases frequentes
advertising aggregate allocation American Economic analysis assume assumption average search success B-type bank behavior birth capital cartel choice coefficients cohort condition consumer consumer surplus coordination Coordination Games countries distribution Economic Review effect efficiency equation equilibrium estimates expected firm fraction function growth Hispanic implies incentives increase industry inequality inflation instrumental variables investments Journal of Economic Kyoto Protocol labor loan sanctions lobby marginal marginal cost match information Medicare Medigap ment monetary policy mortality motorists newspaper circulation nomic odious debt optimal output p-value paper Pareto improving patent percent period profit race racial regime regression risk sample search cost search success rates sector sessions skill social statistically stochastic dominance sumer surplus Table tariff technology shock threshold tion trade troopers University utility variables veteran wage wealth welfare women workers zero