points of difference, if Austria shows good will, and if Germany directs her strength towards conciliation." Unfortunately, neither of these conditions was forthcoming. Austria-Hungary still refused to regard Servia's almost abject response to her menacing Note as even a basis for discussion, and Germany steadily declined to guide her ally into the paths of peace when a word from her would have solved the crisis. The Russian Chargé-d'affaires in Germany telegraphed that same day (July 29) a report of another unsatisfactory conversation with Herr von Jagow, who is understood to have been by no means the most bellicose of the Kaiser's advisers, in which he seriously alleged, "It is extremely difficult to put pressure on Vienna especially openly. To Cambon (M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin) he even added that in the event of too strong pressure Austria would hasten to set before Germany a fait accompli." The Secretary of State added that he had heard from the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg (Pourtalés) that "you (M. Sazanoff) are more inclined than at first to agree to a compromise. I (Brenofsky, Russian Chargéd'affaires in Berlin) said that you had been inclined from the beginning and still were inclined, towards compromise, provided that, of course, it was acceptable not only to Austria but also to us." Herr von Jagow suggested that Russian mobilisation would make it "more difficult for Austria to converse with us, the more so since Austria had mobilised only against Servia, and had made no preparations on our frontiers. I answered that according to my information Austria had also mobilised on our frontier and therefore we had to take corresponding measures. I added that our military measures were in no way directed against Germany." That was Austria-Hungary's position in a nutshell as endorsed by Germany, that she might do what she pleased to Servia, a small Slav Power, send her ultimatums, menace her existence, bombard her capital, invade and ruin her, reduce her to a state of Austrian vassalage without affording the great Slav Power Russia any pretext for interfering. One always comes back to the point from which one starts, namely, that no Powers could ever have assumed such a hopeless position unless they wanted war. The British Government failed to grasp this plain palpable fact but continued to hug the delusion that Berlin and Vienna could be brought to reason. It may not improbably devolve upon the future

historian to record that next to the insensate ambition of the Hohenzollerns this fatuity was a material factor in provoking the conflict. The only hope of maintaining peace was to convince Germany who would then have had no qualms about applying pressure to Austria, that she stood to lose more than she could hope to gain by going to war, and the only effective argument would have been a clear and unequivocal intimation, accompanied by resolute action, that she would not only have to deal with the Dual Alliance, as the whole resources of the British Empire would be thrown into the scale. If we could penetrate into the inmost counsels of Potsdam at this fateful moment we should have come upon the idée fixe that in any event Great Britain would remain neutral. Wisdom after the event now expresses amazement at this signal German miscalculation, but before the event it seemed almost any odds that Perfide Albion would live up to her reputation.

V. FUROR TEUTONICUS

Nor the least interesting diplomatic sidelight on the war was the despatch written by our late Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, immediately after his return to London. He describes the delivery of what is known among the wits as "Runciman's Ultimatum." That our Runcimen should ever have screwed themselves up to the sticking-point would be a mystery were one ignorant of the fact that before doing so they had received a guarantee of their places and emoluments in the shape of an assurance of support from their political opponents which made them independent of the "wild men " of their own Party, nearly all of whom were in favour of hoisting the White Flag of Neutrality even after they knew that Belgium was attacked by Germany. This despatch has probably been less widely read than it deserves, as it appeared at an exciting and anxious moment of the war. The writer describes how he called upon the German Secretary of State on August 4 " and enquired, in the name of his Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be No." His reason was adequate, "As, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning Belgian neutrality had been already violated." The Imperial Government had taken this step because "they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death to them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of the roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time."

One is constrained to interpolate, in justice to the Germansand however unjust, mendacious, and inhuman they may be, there is no reason that Englishmen should follow suit, that it was common

knowledge throughout Europe-outside Downing Street-that whenever Germany went to war with France she would violate Belgian neutrality for the elementary reasons given by Herr von Jagow, and as her strategic railway system converged on the Belgian frontier for no other purpose than the rapid conveyance of troops it seemed sheer hyprocisy to Germans that we should simulate surprise at their violation of Belgian neutrality. It is merely another instance of the colossal ignorance of parliamentary statesmen upon every subject which has no relation to votecatching. The German Foreign Secretary explained to Sir E. Goschen, who not being a parliamentarian can hardly have been astonished, that "this loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops."

Our Ambassador replied, "That this fait accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he (Herr von Jagow) would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences which both he and I would deplore. He replied that for the reasons he had given me it was now impossible for them to draw back." That same afternoon (August 4) Sir E. Goschen delivered the Runciman Ultimatum informing the German Secretary of State, "That unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that his Majesty's Government would have to take all the steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a Treaty to which Germany was as much a party as ourselves." Herr von Jagow replied that this advance through Belgium was a necessity to the German Empire. Our Ambassador "asked him whether in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment, that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my

passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock." Herr von Jagow subsequently "expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain to get closer to France." [My italics.] It was a perfect programme from the German point of view. Our Potsdam Party was evidently relied upon to break up the Entente with France, while we were to become a decoy to inveigle France into deserting Russia and with Russia isolated Europe would be at Germany's mercy. Sir Edward Goschen contented himself with observing, "That this sudden end of my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, his Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done." Afterwards our Ambassador paid his historic " scrap of paper" visit to the Imperial Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, who had hitherto been represented by the Westminster Gazette as a species of German Grey or Haldane. "I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by his Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—' neutrality,' a word which in war-time had so often been disregarded-just for a scrap of paper [my italics]-Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen." Sir E. Goschen "protested strongly against that statement," declaring that just as Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr von Jagow "wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep