If the great Intrigue against the Triple Entente in 1912, which continued right up to the outbreak of war, had succeeded, where should we be to-day. Where would Europe be? The Prussian Junker would be able to march into every capital and there would not be one but many Louvains. "Never again" must the International Jew, guided and governed by racial predilection and by financial interests of which we are ignorant, become a factor in British policy. He must either end his intrigues or change his domicile. If he can't learn wisdom there will arise an irresistible demand that all German Jews shall return to the various countries they came from.

IV. RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY

THE September number of the National Review contained an elaborate analysis emphasised by copious extracts from the White Paper in which the British Foreign Office presented its case to the world. It provides an instructive study in the psychology and operation of Pacifist diplomacy. In the interval Russia has vindicated her action in an Orange Book of which the salient passages have been published in the Manchester Guardian, a quondam Russophobe organ of a peculiarly virulent type, which happily upon the utter fiasco of its Stopthe-war propaganda in the early days of August-continued after Germany had violated Belgian neutrality-came into line against the Huns. We may congratulate ourselves and possibly the Manchester Guardian may congratulate itself that our most extreme pro-Boer and pro-enemy paper, in whose eyes until the other day Great Britain could do no right as Germany could do no wrong, has espoused the national cause for the first time in its existence. This is not the least of the miracles effected by the Napoleon of Potsdam who simultaneously brought into line Mr. Tilak, the Indian sedition monger, Mr. Poutsma, the deported Labour Leader from South Africa, though we have still to hear from Herr Ramsay und Herr Macdonald, to say nothing of Mr. Keir Hardie.

The Orange Book cannot be read unmoved by the Allies of Russia who are indeed fortunate in co-operating with a Power whose Government, from the outset exhibited foresight, firmness, moderation, attachment to peace provided it was peace with honour, in every way worthy of the brilliant skill and irresistible success that have attended Russian armies in the field. The first document in the collection of the Manchester Guardian is the appeal made by the Crown Prince of Servia "to the Czar of Russia " (more accurately described as the Emperor of Russia) after Belgrade had received the ultimatum from Vienna which was calculated and designed to

be a declaration of war with its time limit of forty-eight hours, in which a proud little people of proved prowess were required to accept the position of Austrian vassals under pain of being annihilated in a war intended by the pan-Germans mainly for the humiliation of Russia, who would have either to eat the leek or to fight under conditions in which Potsdam was convinced that she would have no earthly chance of success. In his telegram from Belgrade dated July 24, the Crown Prince of Servia informs the Emperor of Russia:

"Yesterday evening the Austrian Government handed a Note to the Servian Government relating to the Serajevo murders. Servia, in accordance with international custom, on the first day after the terrible murder expressed readiness to open an investigation in her territory if the evidence brought forward by Austria showed the complicity of her subjects. But the demands included in the Austrian Note are not consistent with the maintenance of Servian integrity and aim at her humiliation. Among other things a declaration is demanded from us in the Official Gazette and an Imperial proclamation to the army, in which we denounce the hostile spirit against Austria and express regret for our criminal laxity in relation to such intrigues; further, that we agree to the co-operation of Austrian officials in Servia in the carrying out of the investigations demanded in the Note. They give us forty-eight hours for complying with all this; if not, Austria withdraws its Ambassador from Belgrade.

"We are ready to accept the demands of Austria which can be reconciled with our independence and integrity, and also those which your Highness advises us to accept, and we are willing to punish severely those who are shown to be implicated in the crime. Among the demands are some that will necessitate a change in our legal system, and for this time is indispensable. The time is too short. The Austrian army is posted along our frontier, and can attack us at any moment. We cannot protect ourselves. Therefore we pray your Imperial Majesty to give us help as quickly as possible.

"Your Imperial Majesty has given me abundant evidence of your precious goodwill, and we hope that the call will find a response in your Slav heart, which loves its race. I express the

feeling of the Servian people, which in this troubled time prays your Majesty to take an interest in the fate of Servia.

Although, as we know, the Russian Government was alive and active from the first to the last hour, the Emperor Nicholas deliberated anxiously upon his reply to this moving appeal before sending the following telegram to the Servian Crown Prince :

St. Petersburg, July 27.

"Your Royal Highness, when you turned to me in a most serious moment, did not mistake the feelings which I cherish towards you, and my cordial sympathy for the Servian people. The present state of affairs has roused my warmest attention, and my Government is making all efforts to get rid of the present difficulties. I do not doubt that your Highness and the Royal Government are filled with the desire to lighten this task in that it is neglecting nothing in order to reach a decision which preserves the dignity of Servia and avoids the horror of a new war. So long as there is the least hope of avoiding bloodshed all our efforts must be directed to this goal. Should we, however, against our most earnest wish, have no success, your Highness can be assured that Russia under no circumstances will remain indifferent to the fate of Servia. NICOLAS."

On the same day as the Crown Prince of Servia's appeal to the Emperor, the Russian Chargé-d'affaires in Belgrade (M.Strandman) the Russian Minister having dropped down dead at the Austrian Legation-telegraphed to the very able Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonoff, that the Servian Premier, M. Pashisch, proposed to give Austria within the stipulated time "an answer with an indication of the acceptable and unacceptable points. At the same time there will be sent an appeal to the Powers for the protection of Servian independence. After that, say Pashisch, if war is unavoidable, we shall fight." On the following day (July 25) when the Austrian ultimatum expired M. Sazonoff telegraphed to Count Benckendorff the Russian Ambassador in London:

"At this most critical time and over a question in which the Great Powers may be involved, we assume that England will not

VOL, LXIV

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delay definitely to take its stand by the side of Russia and France in order to preserve the equilibrium of Europe, which has been continually shaken in the past and which will be undoubtedly destroyed in the event of an Austrian triumph."

to us.

66

This was the Russian Foreign Minister's view from the outset, and subsequent events in no way detracted from its wisdom, but Sir Edward Grey was not quick at the uptake and hardly realised the importance of the crisis He probably had his Âme damnée at his elbow in the person of Lord Haldane, whose childish ignorance of Germany is only equalled by his conceit, while our lawyerridden Cabinet imagined that given time for talk every difficulty would be smoothed over. As Great Britain didn't want war how could anybody else want it? Was not the German Emperor the chosen champion of peace? It was sheer lunacy to suppose that he wanted war, &c. Germany might bluff a bit, but so long as we afforded her opportunities of saving face all would be well, and the "greatest of British interests" would be preserved as so often before by talkee-talkee. The Russian Ambassador in London informed M. Sazonoff that Sir Edward Grey had told the German Ambassador, that Austrian mobilisation would mean Russian mobilisation, "and that then there would arise the danger of a general war. He said he saw only one means for a peaceful solution-that in view of the danger of an Austro-Russian mobilisation, Germany, France, Italy and England should keep them back from immediate mobilisation through an offer of mediation. Grey told me that this plan needed, above all, the agreement of Germany and a promise from her not to mobilise. With this object he was making proposals in Berlin for the solution of the problem." Germany had so successfully flattered and fooled the British Government over the Balkan business, in which we fondly imagined that she was co-operating" and that an Anglo-German millennium was at hand to be accompanied by mutual disarmament, that we seriously imagined that we could induce Germany to "persuade Austria to behave reasonably. That was the burden of Sir Edward Grey's song and he returned to the charge again and again with unflagging energy. It never seems to have dawned upon him that the Ultimatum to Servia was a put-up