Mind, Volume 82Oxford University Press, 1973 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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Página 37
... truth claim without an assertor or a truth claimant just as there is no question without an asker . By point of view I understand exactly the truth claimant correlative to a truth claim . The stock objection to all suggestions of this ...
... truth claim without an assertor or a truth claimant just as there is no question without an asker . By point of view I understand exactly the truth claimant correlative to a truth claim . The stock objection to all suggestions of this ...
Página 413
... truth ( qua keeping a promise or telling the truth ) would be to meet corresponding expectations on the part of the receiver of the promise or information ; such expectations could never arise , however , if the receiver knew his ...
... truth ( qua keeping a promise or telling the truth ) would be to meet corresponding expectations on the part of the receiver of the promise or information ; such expectations could never arise , however , if the receiver knew his ...
Página 416
... truth - telling to the actual establishment of the practice of truth- telling cannot count on act - utilitarian premisses , since the problem for the act - utilitarian is exactly to show that such a practice in a society of rational act ...
... truth - telling to the actual establishment of the practice of truth- telling cannot count on act - utilitarian premisses , since the problem for the act - utilitarian is exactly to show that such a practice in a society of rational act ...
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accept action analysis apply argue argument Aristotle assertion assumption behaviour believe Capetian causal claim College colour concept conclusion context criterion definition Denmark Department of Philosophy depicted discussion disposition distinction entails ethical event example existence experience explanation expression external world fact false fulfilment Hegel individual inference intentional J. J. C. Smart J. L. Austin justified kind knowledge language logical London mass nouns means memory Mind Mind Association nature notion nouns object obligation Oxford P. F. Strawson paradox particular personal identity Philosophy Department physical picture possible predicates premiss principle problem Prof properties proposition question R. M. Hare rational reason reductio ad absurdum reference reject relation seems Sellars sense sensory item sentence simply sort statement suppose tautology teleological tense tenseless theory thesis things tiger tion true truth University of Kent University Press