Mind, Volume 82Oxford University Press, 1973 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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Página 22
... simply because all attempts to specify a type of event that might confer action - hood upon the movements which it causes ( or , perhaps , merely ac- companies ) have been shown to lead to insuperable difficulties . Actions may have ...
... simply because all attempts to specify a type of event that might confer action - hood upon the movements which it causes ( or , perhaps , merely ac- companies ) have been shown to lead to insuperable difficulties . Actions may have ...
Página 92
... simply ignoring the question of whether the set of all those sen- tences in Fawtier's book , which simply describe the increase in Capetian power , has any predictive force in its own right . It was not Fawtier's intention to specify ...
... simply ignoring the question of whether the set of all those sen- tences in Fawtier's book , which simply describe the increase in Capetian power , has any predictive force in its own right . It was not Fawtier's intention to specify ...
Página 588
... simply an extension of one of the two earlier rules and an infraction or modification of the other one . Suppose our third rule is One ought to do A when C + C2 ' . The fact that A is also the action prescribed for when C ' is said to ...
... simply an extension of one of the two earlier rules and an infraction or modification of the other one . Suppose our third rule is One ought to do A when C + C2 ' . The fact that A is also the action prescribed for when C ' is said to ...
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accept action analysis apply argue argument Aristotle assertion assumption behaviour believe Capetian causal claim College colour concept conclusion context criterion definition Denmark Department of Philosophy depicted discussion disposition distinction entails ethical event example existence experience explanation expression external world fact false fulfilment Hegel individual inference intentional J. J. C. Smart J. L. Austin justified kind knowledge language logical London mass nouns means memory Mind Mind Association nature notion nouns object obligation Oxford P. F. Strawson paradox particular personal identity Philosophy Department physical picture possible predicates premiss principle problem Prof properties proposition question R. M. Hare rational reason reductio ad absurdum reference reject relation seems Sellars sense sensory item sentence simply sort statement suppose tautology teleological tense tenseless theory thesis things tiger tion true truth University of Kent University Press