Mind, Volume 82Oxford University Press, 1973 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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Página 80
6 6 ' Tap ' is true , it is always true and once false always false . But having said this there are three important things that tenseless sentences ( in the sense that Tap ' is tenseless ) are not . Tense- less sentences are not in any ...
6 6 ' Tap ' is true , it is always true and once false always false . But having said this there are three important things that tenseless sentences ( in the sense that Tap ' is tenseless ) are not . Tense- less sentences are not in any ...
Página 308
... false ' which can be rendered innocuous by showing that it is neither true nor false . So far , so good . However , given our sophisticated approach which recognizes failure of bivalence let us consider the assertion This very sentence ...
... false ' which can be rendered innocuous by showing that it is neither true nor false . So far , so good . However , given our sophisticated approach which recognizes failure of bivalence let us consider the assertion This very sentence ...
Página 443
... false in a reductio ad absurdum argument . 66 ~ ~ ← d ) . ( b . Let us proceed to the second reason for the failure ... false " . Let us call this statement " S1 " . If all statements really were false , S1 would also be false . Thus we ...
... false in a reductio ad absurdum argument . 66 ~ ~ ← d ) . ( b . Let us proceed to the second reason for the failure ... false " . Let us call this statement " S1 " . If all statements really were false , S1 would also be false . Thus we ...
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accept action analysis apply argue argument Aristotle assertion assumption behaviour believe Capetian causal claim College colour concept conclusion context criterion definition Denmark Department of Philosophy depicted discussion disposition distinction entails ethical event example existence experience explanation expression external world fact false fulfilment Hegel individual inference intentional J. J. C. Smart J. L. Austin justified kind knowledge language logical London mass nouns means memory Mind Mind Association nature notion nouns object obligation Oxford P. F. Strawson paradox particular personal identity Philosophy Department physical picture possible predicates premiss principle problem Prof properties proposition question R. M. Hare rational reason reductio ad absurdum reference reject relation seems Sellars sense sensory item sentence simply sort statement suppose tautology teleological tense tenseless theory thesis things tiger tion true truth University of Kent University Press