Mind, Volume 82Oxford University Press, 1973 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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Página 140
... concept of a sentence even more on a level with the concept of a proposition that he is seeking to avoid . For now apparently we have to delve below the misleading surface grammar of familiar natural languages -with their infinitives or ...
... concept of a sentence even more on a level with the concept of a proposition that he is seeking to avoid . For now apparently we have to delve below the misleading surface grammar of familiar natural languages -with their infinitives or ...
Página 203
... concept of antimoral action . It runs the following way : A is an antimoral action if and only if it satisfies paCA , maCA , or paCA . The concept of moral action we may conceive as a disjunction of the concept of antimoral action and ...
... concept of antimoral action . It runs the following way : A is an antimoral action if and only if it satisfies paCA , maCA , or paCA . The concept of moral action we may conceive as a disjunction of the concept of antimoral action and ...
Página 555
... concept relative to which a and b are identical and yet to understand the proposition , " a is ( simply ) the same individual as b " . Following Putnam I have allowed that this may seem so because in some cases we can only specify the ...
... concept relative to which a and b are identical and yet to understand the proposition , " a is ( simply ) the same individual as b " . Following Putnam I have allowed that this may seem so because in some cases we can only specify the ...
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accept action analysis apply argue argument Aristotle assertion assumption behaviour believe Capetian causal claim College colour concept conclusion context criterion definition Denmark Department of Philosophy depicted discussion disposition distinction entails ethical event example existence experience explanation expression external world fact false fulfilment Hegel individual inference intentional J. J. C. Smart J. L. Austin justified kind knowledge language logical London mass nouns means memory Mind Mind Association nature notion nouns object obligation Oxford P. F. Strawson paradox particular personal identity Philosophy Department physical picture possible predicates premiss principle problem Prof properties proposition question R. M. Hare rational reason reductio ad absurdum reference reject relation seems Sellars sense sensory item sentence simply sort statement suppose tautology teleological tense tenseless theory thesis things tiger tion true truth University of Kent University Press