The Salt II Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session, on EX. Y, 96-1 ....U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979 |
Palavras e frases frequentes
Admiral ZUMWALT agree allies Ambassador EARLE Ambassador JOHNSON Ambassador SMITH Ambassador WARNKE American arms control arms race attack Backfire ballistic missiles believe capability Chairman civil defense committee concerned CONGRESS THE LIBRARY consider cruise missiles deploy deployment disarmament Europe European fact going ICBM's intelligence issue Joint Chiefs land-based LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ment military MIRVed MIRVed missiles monitoring national technical means NATO negotiations nuclear forces nuclear war nuclear weapons percent political position President problem proposed protocol provisions question ratified reductions Rostow Russians SALT II agreement SALT II Treaty SALT process Secretary BROWN Senator BIDEN Senator GLENN Senator HELMS Senator JAVITS Senator McGovern Senator MUSKIE Senator PELL Senator PERCY Senator SARBANES Senator STONE Senator ZORINSKY sides SLBM Soviet Union statement strategic forces strategic nuclear submarines talking Thank theater theater nuclear forces things throw-weight tion United verification violation Vladivostok vulnerable weapons systems
Passagens conhecidas
Página 253 - Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.
Página 51 - Treaty, neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.
Página 13 - ... turmoil and peril. There is, as you point out, a division of opinion among the American people regarding the necessity of reinforcing our military strength. The first point I would like to make is that In judging between conflicting views on this matter, the deciding factor must be their relevance to the world as it is, not as we would wish It to be.
Página 169 - We do not believe that the Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose the USSR to a higher risk of nuclear attack.
Página 14 - Congress recognizes the difficulty of maintaining a stable strategic balance in a period of rapidly developing technology; the Congress recognizes the principle of United States-Soviet Union equality reflected in the antiballistic missile treaty, and urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union...
Página 163 - Soviet civil defenses could reduce casualties to the low tens of millions. — While many of the essential personnel sheltered at economic facilities would probably survive an attack, the Soviets could not prevent massive damage to their economy and the destruction of many of their most valued material accomplishments.
Página 166 - New plants have often been built next to major existing plants. Existing plants and complexes have been expanded. No effort has been made to increase the distance between buildings or to locate additions in such a way as to minimize fire and other hazards in the event of a nuclear attack. Previously open spaces at fuel storage sites have been filled with new storage tanks and processing units.
Página 195 - Nevertheless, a single segment of a nation's military power cannot usefully be evaluated in isolation. There is no question that Soviet momentum has brought them from a position of clear inferiority to their present status of at least strategic equality with the United States and the trends for the future are adverse.
Página 168 - The critical time for preparation appears to be about two or three days, because only by evacuating could the Soviets hope to avert massive losses. With a few days for final preparations, casualties could be reduced by more than 50 percent; most of this reduction would be due to evacuation, the remainder to shelters.