Mind, Volume 104

accept Achilles action analysis antecedent argues argument Aristotle assertion Begriffsschrift Blackwell Brendan Burge Cambridge causal claim cognitive concept conclusion counterfactuals definite descriptions degree of belief Descartes discussion distinction Doesn't-will Dummett entails epistemic epistemology example explain expression extensional fact false Frege function George Orwell given haecceity hidden-indexical idea inference internalist interpretation issues justified kind King's College London knowledge language linguistic logical logically equivalent London mathematical meaning mental metaphysical mind Moore's Paradox moral natural not-P notion objects Oxford University Press particular person Philosophy predicate premise present principle problem properties proposition propositional attitudes PSLE question Quine rational reason to believe reference relation relevant requires Russell's S-connective seems semantics sense sentence simply singular terms someone speaker sufficient reason Suppose tall theory theory of descriptions thesis things thought tion tortoise true truth conditions truth-functional truth-value understand utterance virtue