The Logic of StrategyCristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms Oxford University Press, 02/09/1999 - 208 páginas Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form formulations of complex decision problems. |
Índice
1 Knowledge Belief and Counterfacual Reasoning in Games | 3 |
2 Consequentialism NonArchimedean Probabilities and Lexicographic Expected Utility | 39 |
3 Solutions Based on Ratiftability and Sure Thing Reasoning | 67 |
4 Undercutting and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals | 82 |
5 Aumanns No Agreement Theorem Generalized | 92 |
6 Rational Failures of the KK Principle | 101 |
7 How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention? | 119 |
8 Sophisticated Bounded Agents Play the Repeated Dilemma | 137 |
9 Can Free Choice Be Known? | 163 |
10 Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoners Dilemma | 175 |
Outras edições - Ver tudo
The Logic of Strategy Cristina Bicchieri,Richard C. Jeffrey,Brian Skyrms Pré-visualização limitada - 1999 |
The Logic of Strategy Cristina Bicchieri,Richard Jeffrey,Brian Skyrms Pré-visualização indisponível - 1999 |
Palavras e frases frequentes
actions actual world agents assume Aumann axiom backward induction Backward Induction Argument behavior belief revision causally independent causally possible chance nodes choose coin landed common belief common knowledge compatible condition consequentialist consider cooperation counterfactual d₁ d₂ decision node decision theory decision trees defect defined definition denote depth-limits dominated strategies doxastically epistemic epistemic logic equilibrium expected utility extensive form games false finite frame FRPD game theory given Harper Identicality assumption implies indirect test information set KK principle Lemma lexicographic logic mixed strategy Nash equilibrium non-Archimedean probabilities nonempty nonmonotonic normal form outcome partition payoff perfect rationality perfectly rational play player 2's possible worlds Prisoner's Dilemma probability distribution problem proof proposition Ramsey test random consequences rationalizability real numbers result RPFs satisfy Section set of strategies sophistication Stalnaker strategic form strategy profile subset Suppose symmetric thinker tion true utility function weakly dominated Σκεκ
Passagens conhecidas
Página xi - Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, JL Kellogg Graduate School of Management. Northwestern University.
Referências a este livro
The Complex Networks of Economic Interactions: Essays in Agent-Based ... Akira Namatame,Taisei Kaizouji,Yuuji Aruka Pré-visualização indisponível - 2006 |