The Logic of Strategy

Capa
Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms
Oxford University Press, 02/09/1999 - 208 páginas
Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form formulations of complex decision problems.
 

Índice

1 Knowledge Belief and Counterfacual Reasoning in Games
3
2 Consequentialism NonArchimedean Probabilities and Lexicographic Expected Utility
39
3 Solutions Based on Ratiftability and Sure Thing Reasoning
67
4 Undercutting and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals
82
5 Aumanns No Agreement Theorem Generalized
92
6 Rational Failures of the KK Principle
101
7 How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?
119
8 Sophisticated Bounded Agents Play the Repeated Dilemma
137
9 Can Free Choice Be Known?
163
10 Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoners Dilemma
175
Direitos de autor

Outras edições - Ver tudo

Palavras e frases frequentes

Passagens conhecidas

Página xi - Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, JL Kellogg Graduate School of Management. Northwestern University.

Informação bibliográfica