The American Economic Review, Volume 87,Edições 4-5American Economic Association., 1997 |
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Página 513
Utility B Agent B ( Country B ) Bilateral FTA Agent A ( Country A ) A K / L FIGURE 2. THE Impossibility oF UNDERMINING IN ... countries . PROOF : Define a regional agreement ( R ) as a free- trade agreement among any proper subset of the ...
Utility B Agent B ( Country B ) Bilateral FTA Agent A ( Country A ) A K / L FIGURE 2. THE Impossibility oF UNDERMINING IN ... countries . PROOF : Define a regional agreement ( R ) as a free- trade agreement among any proper subset of the ...
Página 517
... countries . PROOF : Return to the notation of Proposition 2 , in which k represents the capital - labor ratio of the median agent in country c and the ratio of all the capital to all the labor in an inte- grated economy e will be ...
... countries . PROOF : Return to the notation of Proposition 2 , in which k represents the capital - labor ratio of the median agent in country c and the ratio of all the capital to all the labor in an inte- grated economy e will be ...
Página 931
... countries . A second important issue concerns possible variations over time in the degree of centrali- zation of the labor market in a given country . This aspect is particularly difficult to quantify because none of the existing ...
... countries . A second important issue concerns possible variations over time in the degree of centrali- zation of the labor market in a given country . This aspect is particularly difficult to quantify because none of the existing ...
Índice
VOLUME 87 NUMBER | 475 |
A PoliticalEconomic Analysis of FreeTrade | 506 |
An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity | 520 |
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