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side of ( 5 ) is the poor person's expected utility with government transfer T , coverage level z and charitable transfer 7 * ( T , z ) in the bad state . The coverage level z * ( T ) is therefore the expected - utility - maximizing ...
side of ( 5 ) is the poor person's expected utility with government transfer T , coverage level z and charitable transfer 7 * ( T , z ) in the bad state . The coverage level z * ( T ) is therefore the expected - utility - maximizing ...
Página 161
30That is , the expected utility of both the government and the central banker can be shown to be decreasing in a , so central bankers with low a's earn higher expected utility and are preferred by the government .
30That is , the expected utility of both the government and the central banker can be shown to be decreasing in a , so central bankers with low a's earn higher expected utility and are preferred by the government .
Página 149
W I assume that workers select calories and labor allocations to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint . The utility function is u ( h , x ) = ln ( h ) + x , where h = c - n ( lp + m + ) denotes health , c denotes caloric ...
W I assume that workers select calories and labor allocations to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint . The utility function is u ( h , x ) = ln ( h ) + x , where h = c - n ( lp + m + ) denotes health , c denotes caloric ...
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Índice
Evidence? | 17 |
The Effect of Institutions on Economic Behavior | 409 |
Theory of Contracts | 432 |
Direitos de autor | |
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aggregate analysis assume average bank behavior benefits capital central changes choice coefficient condition consumption contract correlation cost countries decision demand depends discussion Economic effect employment equal equation equilibrium estimates evidence example expected firms function given growth higher households important income increase individual industry inflation interest International issue Journal labor less lower marginal mean measure ment monetary Notes observations output percent period player political population positive possible preferences Press probability problem question ratio reduce regression relative reported Research response Review risk rules sample schooling sector shocks significant social spending standard statistically studies suggests Table theory tion trade transfer United University utility variables wage welfare workers