The American Economic Review, Volume 85,Edições 1-3American Economic Association, 1995 |
No interior do livro
Resultados 1-3 de 51
Página 49
... transfer can then be thought of as foreign aid . II . Government Transfer Policy When Citizens Can Commit This section analyzes optimal transfer policies in the case when the rich can com- mit to a level of charitable transfers before ...
... transfer can then be thought of as foreign aid . II . Government Transfer Policy When Citizens Can Commit This section analyzes optimal transfer policies in the case when the rich can com- mit to a level of charitable transfers before ...
Página 52
... transfer program . PROOF : - Part ( ii ) of Lemma 1 implies that if the poor person would not take out insurance when given the transfer T ° , he will forgo it if given any smaller transfer . It follows that public provision of any cash ...
... transfer program . PROOF : - Part ( ii ) of Lemma 1 implies that if the poor person would not take out insurance when given the transfer T ° , he will forgo it if given any smaller transfer . It follows that public provision of any cash ...
Página 54
... transfer § ( T ) —z in the bad state . As noted earlier , any distribution of this transfer between the two rich individu- als is a possible equilibrium , but suppose for concreteness that the rich expect to con- tribute equal amounts ...
... transfer § ( T ) —z in the bad state . As noted earlier , any distribution of this transfer between the two rich individu- als is a possible equilibrium , but suppose for concreteness that the rich expect to con- tribute equal amounts ...
Índice
Evidence? | 17 |
Dan Kovenock and Gordon Phillips | 403 |
The Effect of Institutions on Economic Behavior | 409 |
Direitos de autor | |
6 outras secções não apresentadas
Outras edições - Ver tudo
Palavras e frases frequentes
aggregate analysis assume average behavior benefits bill rate Bretton Woods Cambridge cartels central bank cheap talk choice coefficient consumption contract correlation cost countries deutsche mark drug effect employment equation estimates evidence expected fiat money firms forecast genotype growth households human capital hypothesis implies incentive income increase individual industry inflation investment Journal of Economic labor market lagged liquidity constraints marginal Medicaid ment minimum wage monetary policy monomorphic Nash equilibrium National nomic nontraded null hypothesis optimal output paper payoff function percent player political population preferences problem quota ratio reduce regression relative Research response revenue risk Robert sample sector shocks significant social Solow residuals spending statistically strategy studies supply shocks symmetric Nash Table tax rates theory tion tive trade University utility variables voters welfare workers y₁ zero