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Página 68
party , a victim cannot identify the injurer , parties are unaware of the size of the risk or lack the information to make a rational choice , the task can be performed by using a safer alternative technology , or the risk is inflicted ...
party , a victim cannot identify the injurer , parties are unaware of the size of the risk or lack the information to make a rational choice , the task can be performed by using a safer alternative technology , or the risk is inflicted ...
Página 450
( 1995 ) we also found that increases in crop risk ( higher CV's ) actually decreased the probability of crop - sharing , suggesting that measurement costs explain contract choice , since greater exogenous risk makes crop measurement more ...
( 1995 ) we also found that increases in crop risk ( higher CV's ) actually decreased the probability of crop - sharing , suggesting that measurement costs explain contract choice , since greater exogenous risk makes crop measurement more ...
Página 450
( 1995 ) we also found that increases in crop risk ( higher CV's ) actually decreased the probability of crop - sharing , suggesting that measurement costs explain contract choice , since greater exogenous risk makes crop measurement more ...
( 1995 ) we also found that increases in crop risk ( higher CV's ) actually decreased the probability of crop - sharing , suggesting that measurement costs explain contract choice , since greater exogenous risk makes crop measurement more ...
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Índice
Evidence? | 17 |
The Effect of Institutions on Economic Behavior | 409 |
Theory of Contracts | 432 |
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aggregate analysis assume average bank behavior benefits capital central changes choice coefficient condition consumption contract correlation cost countries decision demand depends discussion Economic effect employment equal equation equilibrium estimates evidence example expected firms function given growth higher households important income increase individual industry inflation interest International issue Journal labor less lower marginal mean measure ment monetary Notes observations output percent period player political population positive possible preferences Press probability problem question ratio reduce regression relative reported Research response Review risk rules sample schooling sector shocks significant social spending standard statistically studies suggests Table theory tion trade transfer United University utility variables wage welfare workers