The American Economic Review, Volume 85,Edições 1-3American Economic Association, 1995 |
No interior do livro
Resultados 1-3 de 17
Página 87
... quota binding on one firm must also bind on all firms with smaller indexes . For suppose the quota F is just binding on firm j . Consider some firm i where i > j . Subtracting ( 4 ) from ( 3 ) , we obtain : ( 5 ) P ( Y ( F ) ) + q ; F ...
... quota binding on one firm must also bind on all firms with smaller indexes . For suppose the quota F is just binding on firm j . Consider some firm i where i > j . Subtracting ( 4 ) from ( 3 ) , we obtain : ( 5 ) P ( Y ( F ) ) + q ; F ...
Página 93
... quota F * = Y * / Qn , where Q , denotes aggregate capacity . Then , ( 12 ) can be rewritten as n ( 13 ) P ( Q „ F ... quota must be ( weakly ) smaller than the cutoff of the largest firm ( F * < F ) . Indeed , the monopoly quota must ...
... quota F * = Y * / Qn , where Q , denotes aggregate capacity . Then , ( 12 ) can be rewritten as n ( 13 ) P ( Q „ F ... quota must be ( weakly ) smaller than the cutoff of the largest firm ( F * < F ) . Indeed , the monopoly quota must ...
Página 94
... quota and may in addition result in a lower price than would occur if industry profit were fully maximized . But a new phe- nomenon may also arise when marginal costs differ : the quota chosen by the cartel may be more restrictive than ...
... quota and may in addition result in a lower price than would occur if industry profit were fully maximized . But a new phe- nomenon may also arise when marginal costs differ : the quota chosen by the cartel may be more restrictive than ...
Índice
Evidence? | 17 |
Dan Kovenock and Gordon Phillips | 403 |
The Effect of Institutions on Economic Behavior | 409 |
Direitos de autor | |
6 outras secções não apresentadas
Outras edições - Ver tudo
Palavras e frases frequentes
aggregate analysis assume average behavior benefits bill rate Bretton Woods Cambridge cartels central bank cheap talk choice coefficient consumption contract correlation cost countries deutsche mark drug effect employment equation estimates evidence expected fiat money firms forecast genotype growth households human capital hypothesis implies incentive income increase individual industry inflation investment Journal of Economic labor market lagged liquidity constraints marginal Medicaid ment minimum wage monetary policy monomorphic Nash equilibrium National nomic nontraded null hypothesis optimal output paper payoff function percent player political population preferences problem quota ratio reduce regression relative Research response revenue risk Robert sample sector shocks significant social Solow residuals spending statistically strategy studies supply shocks symmetric Nash Table tax rates theory tion tive trade University utility variables voters welfare workers y₁ zero