No interior do livro
Resultados 1-3 de 27
Página 246
In Card Sharks , players deal with computable risks , and should not suffer from this bias . ... Player 1 has a decision to make , but as long as she does not violate the constraint that y1 ≤ x1 -2x2 , she need not concern herself with ...
In Card Sharks , players deal with computable risks , and should not suffer from this bias . ... Player 1 has a decision to make , but as long as she does not violate the constraint that y1 ≤ x1 -2x2 , she need not concern herself with ...
Página 250
tween the betting behavior of players who eventually answered correctly and the behavior of players who did not . ... Using the same method , one can easily calculate that player 1 is making a bet close to the empirical - best ...
tween the betting behavior of players who eventually answered correctly and the behavior of players who did not . ... Using the same method , one can easily calculate that player 1 is making a bet close to the empirical - best ...
Página 188
It is also clear that when players ' interests are not well aligned ( e.g. , in two - player zero - sum games ) , cheap talk will do nothing . But further exploration quickly encounters thorny problems . For example , Robert Aumann ...
It is also clear that when players ' interests are not well aligned ( e.g. , in two - player zero - sum games ) , cheap talk will do nothing . But further exploration quickly encounters thorny problems . For example , Robert Aumann ...
Opinião das pessoas - Escrever uma crítica
Não foram encontradas quaisquer críticas nos locais habituais.
Índice
Evidence? | 17 |
The Effect of Institutions on Economic Behavior | 409 |
Theory of Contracts | 432 |
Direitos de autor | |
10 outras secções não apresentadas
Outras edições - Ver tudo
Palavras e frases frequentes
aggregate analysis assume average bank behavior benefits capital central changes choice coefficient condition consumption contract correlation cost countries decision demand depends discussion Economic effect employment equal equation equilibrium estimates evidence example expected firms function given growth higher households important income increase individual industry inflation interest International issue Journal labor less lower marginal mean measure ment monetary Notes observations output percent period player political population positive possible preferences Press probability problem question ratio reduce regression relative reported Research response Review risk rules sample schooling sector shocks significant social spending standard statistically studies suggests Table theory tion trade transfer United University utility variables wage welfare workers