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Página 68
Nash equilibrium : the outcome in which both hunt the stag . Since Stag Hunt is a game with symmetric complementarity , one knows from Proposition 4 that every symmetric Nash equilibrium for the game with payoff is a symmetric Nash ...
Nash equilibrium : the outcome in which both hunt the stag . Since Stag Hunt is a game with symmetric complementarity , one knows from Proposition 4 that every symmetric Nash equilibrium for the game with payoff is a symmetric Nash ...
Página 70
Points below the line R = 2P represent parameter values for which a monomorphic equilibrium population of defectors resists invasion by dominant mutants . The set of all such points is the union of the regions H and I. For parameter ...
Points below the line R = 2P represent parameter values for which a monomorphic equilibrium population of defectors resists invasion by dominant mutants . The set of all such points is the union of the regions H and I. For parameter ...
Página 284
( b ) n = ( 0,1 ) is an equilibrium if and only if 1 - m 1 - m k ( k - 1 ) k 412 c1 ≤ č1 = ( c ) n = ( 1,0 ) is an equilibrium if and only if m ( 1 - m ) ( k −2 ) k ( k − 1 ) ( rk + 1 - m ) rV1 = PROOF : Consider case ( b ) .
( b ) n = ( 0,1 ) is an equilibrium if and only if 1 - m 1 - m k ( k - 1 ) k 412 c1 ≤ č1 = ( c ) n = ( 1,0 ) is an equilibrium if and only if m ( 1 - m ) ( k −2 ) k ( k − 1 ) ( rk + 1 - m ) rV1 = PROOF : Consider case ( b ) .
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Evidence? | 17 |
The Effect of Institutions on Economic Behavior | 409 |
Theory of Contracts | 432 |
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