The American Economic Review, Volume 85,Edições 1-3American Economic Association, 1995 |
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Página 160
... depends on output . Contracts based on ( 17 ) may be difficult to implement because they depend on y * , the government's target level of real output . This may be private information to the gov- ernment , and therefore it may not be ...
... depends on output . Contracts based on ( 17 ) may be difficult to implement because they depend on y * , the government's target level of real output . This may be private information to the gov- ernment , and therefore it may not be ...
Página 255
... depends upon the lobby contributions and the policies : π ( c1 , c2 ; α1 , α 2 ) . ASSUMPTION 1 : π is strictly increasing in c1 and strictly decreasing in c2 . Magee and Brock ( 1983 ) give an interpre- tation of Assumption 1 based on ...
... depends upon the lobby contributions and the policies : π ( c1 , c2 ; α1 , α 2 ) . ASSUMPTION 1 : π is strictly increasing in c1 and strictly decreasing in c2 . Magee and Brock ( 1983 ) give an interpre- tation of Assumption 1 based on ...
Página 177
... depends on tax rates . Another potentially important response is the repackaging of ordinary income flows into capital gains ( e.g. , buying and fixing up houses for resale ) . The revenue pickup from the increased capital gains must be ...
... depends on tax rates . Another potentially important response is the repackaging of ordinary income flows into capital gains ( e.g. , buying and fixing up houses for resale ) . The revenue pickup from the increased capital gains must be ...
Índice
Evidence? | 17 |
Dan Kovenock and Gordon Phillips | 403 |
The Effect of Institutions on Economic Behavior | 409 |
Direitos de autor | |
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aggregate analysis assume average behavior benefits bill rate Bretton Woods Cambridge cartels central bank cheap talk choice coefficient consumption contract correlation cost countries deutsche mark drug effect employment equation estimates evidence expected fiat money firms forecast genotype growth households human capital hypothesis implies incentive income increase individual industry inflation investment Journal of Economic labor market lagged liquidity constraints marginal Medicaid ment minimum wage monetary policy monomorphic Nash equilibrium National nomic nontraded null hypothesis optimal output paper payoff function percent player political population preferences problem quota ratio reduce regression relative Research response revenue risk Robert sample sector shocks significant social Solow residuals spending statistically strategy studies supply shocks symmetric Nash Table tax rates theory tion tive trade University utility variables voters welfare workers y₁ zero