No interior do livro
Resultados 1-3 de 82
Página 152
In order to focus on the nature of the incentives with which the central bank should be faced , I assume that both the government and the individuals who might head the bank share the same preferences over inflation and output ...
In order to focus on the nature of the incentives with which the central bank should be faced , I assume that both the government and the individuals who might head the bank share the same preferences over inflation and output ...
Página 162
It is optimal to have central bankers with less ability exert more effort , but not enough to completely compensate for their lower ability . As a result , social welfare is decreasing in a . B. Imperfect Information on the Central ...
It is optimal to have central bankers with less ability exert more effort , but not enough to completely compensate for their lower ability . As a result , social welfare is decreasing in a . B. Imperfect Information on the Central ...
Página 210
( 1995 ) concerning contracts between a nation's government and its central bank . Specifically , these writers have shown that , if the government provides the central bank with a " contract " ( i.e. , incentive scheme ) that makes its ...
( 1995 ) concerning contracts between a nation's government and its central bank . Specifically , these writers have shown that , if the government provides the central bank with a " contract " ( i.e. , incentive scheme ) that makes its ...
Opinião das pessoas - Escrever uma crítica
Não foram encontradas quaisquer críticas nos locais habituais.
Índice
Evidence? | 17 |
The Effect of Institutions on Economic Behavior | 409 |
Theory of Contracts | 432 |
Direitos de autor | |
10 outras secções não apresentadas
Outras edições - Ver tudo
Palavras e frases frequentes
aggregate analysis assume average bank behavior benefits capital central changes choice coefficient condition consumption contract correlation cost countries decision demand depends discussion Economic effect employment equal equation equilibrium estimates evidence example expected firms function given growth higher households important income increase individual industry inflation interest International issue Journal labor less lower marginal mean measure ment monetary Notes observations output percent period player political population positive possible preferences Press probability problem question ratio reduce regression relative reported Research response Review risk rules sample schooling sector shocks significant social spending standard statistically studies suggests Table theory tion trade transfer United University utility variables wage welfare workers