The American Economic Review, Volume 85,Edições 1-3American Economic Association, 1995 |
No interior do livro
Resultados 1-3 de 79
Página 85
... assume in our basic model that F is chosen by the un- weighted majority - rule voting of the regu- lated firms . We assume that these firms are self - interested not merely in their subse- quent production choices , but also in their ...
... assume in our basic model that F is chosen by the un- weighted majority - rule voting of the regu- lated firms . We assume that these firms are self - interested not merely in their subse- quent production choices , but also in their ...
Página 222
... assume that labor is the only input to pro- duction and that there are constant returns to scale . Total labor input will consist of the product of a number of workers , L ,, the number of hours worked per worker ( as- sumed for the ...
... assume that labor is the only input to pro- duction and that there are constant returns to scale . Total labor input will consist of the product of a number of workers , L ,, the number of hours worked per worker ( as- sumed for the ...
Página 649
... assume that dc ' / dz ' < 0 . Higher values of z ' are more favorable in the sense that an increase in z ' decreases firm i's constant marginal cost . - LEMMA 1 : Assume that marginal cost is constant . R'z = = ( i ) If z represents ...
... assume that dc ' / dz ' < 0 . Higher values of z ' are more favorable in the sense that an increase in z ' decreases firm i's constant marginal cost . - LEMMA 1 : Assume that marginal cost is constant . R'z = = ( i ) If z represents ...
Índice
Evidence? | 17 |
Dan Kovenock and Gordon Phillips | 403 |
The Effect of Institutions on Economic Behavior | 409 |
Direitos de autor | |
6 outras secções não apresentadas
Outras edições - Ver tudo
Palavras e frases frequentes
aggregate analysis assume average behavior benefits bill rate Bretton Woods Cambridge cartels central bank cheap talk choice coefficient consumption contract correlation cost countries deutsche mark drug effect employment equation estimates evidence expected fiat money firms forecast genotype growth households human capital hypothesis implies incentive income increase individual industry inflation investment Journal of Economic labor market lagged liquidity constraints marginal Medicaid ment minimum wage monetary policy monomorphic Nash equilibrium National nomic nontraded null hypothesis optimal output paper payoff function percent player political population preferences problem quota ratio reduce regression relative Research response revenue risk Robert sample sector shocks significant social Solow residuals spending statistically strategy studies supply shocks symmetric Nash Table tax rates theory tion tive trade University utility variables voters welfare workers y₁ zero