Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1944, Volume 4Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959 |
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Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1944, Volume 4,Parte 3,Edição 2 Maurice Matloff,Edwin Marion Snell Visualização integral - 1959 |
Palavras e frases frequentes
381 SS Papers agreed Air Force Allied American amphibious ANAKIM ANVIL Army planners Arnold Balkans Bomber Offensive British Chiefs Burma campaign Casablanca Chennault Chiang Chiefs of Staff China Chinese Churchill CM-IN CM-OUT CofS command Conf Book conference cross-Channel operation decision Defeat of Japan divisions effort Eisenhower Europe European filed France Germany Handy HUSKY invasion Italy Item Japan Japanese Joint JSSC King landing craft Leahy logistical MacArthur manpower Marshall McNarney Mediterranean Memo ment Middle East mtg CCS naval Navy Nimitz opera over-all OVERLORD Pacific war political President Prime Minister problem proposed QUADRANT Rabaul ranean Roosevelt SEXTANT sions SOPAC Soviet Stilwell SWPA tegic Tenth Air Force theater tion TRIDENT troops U.S. Army U.S. forces U.S. military U.S. staff United Kingdom USSR War Department Washington WDCSA Wedemeyer
Passagens conhecidas
Página 28 - Your primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point •where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.
Página 576 - The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan The...
Página 536 - Personally and aside from all logistic, tactical or strategical implications, I would be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes.
Página 440 - I fail to see how an operation against Sumatra and Malaya, requiring tremendous resources and forces, can possibly be mounted until after the conclusion of the war in Europe. Lucrative as a successful "Culverin" might be, there appears much more to be gained by employing all the resources we now have available in an all-out drive into Upper Burma so that we can build up our air strength in China and ensure the essential support for our westward advance to the Formosa-China-Luzon area.
Página 525 - ... change more comparable indeed with that occasioned by the fall of Rome than with any other change occurring during the succeeding fifteen hundred years.
Página 11 - Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948); while the strongly anti-Stimson view taken by Richard N.
Página 214 - We cannot now rationally hope to be able to cross the Channel and come to grips with our German enemy under a British commander. His, Prime Minister and his Chief of the Imperial Staff are frankly at variance with such a proposal. The shadows of Passchendaele and Dunkerque still hang too heavily over the imagination of these leaders of his government. Though they have rendered lip service to the operation...
Página 474 - Finally, for purely political considerations over here, I should never survive even a slight setback in "OVERLORD...
Página 493 - I do not want the United States to have the post-war burden of reconstituting France, Italy and the Balkans. This is not our natural task at a distance of 3,500 miles or more. It is definitely a British task in which the British are far more vitally interested than we are.
Página 493 - Do please don't' ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France, and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now!"36 Nor would the American public tolerate a common AngloAmerican policy toward Europe.