 If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego,...  The Princeton Review - Página 181882Visualização integral - Acerca deste livro
 | 1866 - 830 páginas
...the statement by calling it a scries of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the...something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series... | |
 | Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool - 1897 - 346 páginas
...Mill, with his usual candour, states the case thus — " We are reduced (by the phenomena of memory) to the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego...something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which is, ex hypothesi, but a series... | |
 | John Stuart Mill - 1865 - 342 páginas
...the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the...something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series... | |
 | 1865 - 550 páginas
...the statement by calling it a series of feolings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the...something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series... | |
 | John Stuart Mill - 1865 - 578 páginas
...the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the...something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series... | |
 | John Stuart Mill - 1865 - 578 páginas
...speak of it in terms which assume a theory, to use them with a reservation as to their meaning. ing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex /iypothesi is but a series... | |
 | David Masson - 1865 - 432 páginas
...statement by calling it a series " of feelings which is aware of itself as past and " future ; and we are reduced to the alternative " of believing that the mind, or Ego, is some" thing different from any series of feelings or " possibilities of them, or of accepting the para"... | |
 | James McCosh - 1866 - 424 páginas
...state" ment by calling it a series of feelings which is aware " of itself as past and future: and we are reduced to " the alternative of believing that...something different from any series of feelings or pos" sibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that " something which ex hypothesi is but a... | |
 | 1866 - 618 páginas
...the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the...something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series... | |
 | 1866 - 650 páginas
...the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the...something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series... | |
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