The Deconstitutionalization of America: The Forgotten Frailties of Democratic Rule

Capa
Lexington Books, 2004 - 162 páginas
The American Constitution held out the hope that ordinary people were capable of deciding their own fates, and in doing so it immeasurably elevated the dignity of common people. The organization and interplay of the parts that comprise the whole American government exist to provide people the opportunity to govern themselves and, at the same time, reveal the limits of democratic self-rule. The forgetting of these limits is not only destructive to the constitution but the nation as a whole.
 

Índice

James Madisons Constitution of Freedom
9
Abraham Lincolns New Birth of Freedom
25
Woodrow Wilsons Progressive Constitution
50
Franklin Roosevelt the Great Depression and the Rise of InterestGroup Government
67
Congress Increased Power and Institutional Weakness
79
Presidential Leadership and the Two Publics
98
The Modern Judiciary and Palliative Government Still the Least Dangerous Branch?
112
Deconstitutionalization and American Foreign Policy
126
National Performance Review and Madisonian Constitutionalism The Persistence of Wilsonian Administrative Thought
136
Conclusion
149
Selected Bibliography
155
Index
159
About the Authors
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Roger M. Barrus is Elliott Professor of Political Science at Hampden-Sydney College. John H. Eastby is Elliott Professor of Political Science at Hampden-Sydney College and Director of the Western Culture Program. Joseph H. Lane, Jr. is Assistant Professor at Emory and Henry College. David E. Marion is Elliott Professor of Political Science at Hampden-Sydney College and Director, Center for Leadership in the Public Interest. James F. Pontuso is Elliott Professor of Political Science at Hampden-Sydney College.

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