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prohibited, in return, the importation of Eng-means of subsistence. The disorder which lish woollens. In 1700, the prohibition of this would occasion might no doubt be very importing bone lace into England was taken considerable. It would in all probability, off, upon condition that the importation of however, be much less than is commonly imaEnglish woollens into Flanders should be put gined, for the two following reasons: on the saine footing as before.

First, All those manufactures of which any There may be good policy in retaliations of part is commonly exported to other European this kind, when there is a probability that they countries without a bounty, could be very litwill procure the repeal of the high duties or tle affected by the freest importation of foreign prohibitions complained of. The recovery of goods. Such manufactures must be sold as a great foreign market will generally more cheap abroad as any other foreign goods of the than compensate the transitory inconveniency same quality and kind, and consequently must of paying dearer during a short time for some be sold cheaper at home. They would still, sorts of goods. To judge whether such reta- therefore, keep possession of the home marliations are likely to produce such an effect, ket; and though a capricious man of fashion does not, perhaps, belong so much to the might sometimes prefer foreign wares, merely science of a legislator, whose deliberations because they were foreign, to cheaper and betought to be governed by general principles, ter goods of the same kind that were made at which are always the same, as to the skill of home, this folly could, from the nature of that insidious and crafty animal vulgarly call- things, extend to so few, that it could make no ed a statesman or politician, whose councils sensible impression upon the general employare directed by the momentary fluctuations of ment of the people. But a great part of all affairs. When there is no probability that any the different branches of our woollen manusuch repeal can be procured, it seems a bad facture, of our tanned leather, and of our method of compensating the injury done to hardware, are annually exported to other Eu, certain classes of our people, to do another in- ropean countries without any bounty, and jury ourselves, not only to those classes, but these are the manufactures which employ the to almost all the other classes of them. When greatest number of hands. The silk, perhaps, our neighbours prohibit some manufacture of is the manufacture which would suffer the ours, we generally prohibit, not only the same, most by this freedom of trade, and after it the for that alone would seldom affect them con- linen, though the latter much less than the siderably, but some other manufacture of former.

theirs. This may, no doubt, give encourage- Secondly, Though a great number of people ment to some particular class of workmen should, by thus restoring the freedom of trade, among ourselves, and, by excluding some of be thrown all at once out of their ordinary their rivals, may enable them to raise their employment and common method of subsistprice in the home market. Those workmen ence, it would by no means follow that they however, who suffered by our neighbours pro- would thereby be deprived either of employhibition, will not be benefited by ours. On ment or subsistence. By the reduction of the the contrary, they, and almost all the other army and navy at the end of the late war, classes of our citizens, will thereby be obliged to pay dearer than before for certain goods. Every such law, therefore, imposes a real tax upon the whole country, not in favour of that particular class of workmen who were injured by our neighbours prohibitions, but of some other class.

more than 100,000 soldiers and seamen, a number equal to what is employed in the greatest manufactures, were all at once thrown out of their ordinary employment: but though they no doubt suffered some inconveniency, they were not thereby deprived of all employ ment and subsistence. The greater part of The case in which it may sometimes be a the seamen, it is probable, gradually betook matter of deliberation, how far, or in what themselves to the merchant service as they manner, it is proper to restore the free impor- could find occasion, and in the mean time both tation of foreign goods, after it has been for they and the soldiers were absorbed in the some time interrupted, is when particular ma- great mass of the people, and employed in a nufactures, by means of high duties or prohi- great variety of occupations. Not only no bitions upon all foreign goods which can come great convulsion, but no sensible disorder, ainto competition with them, have been so far rose from so great a change in the situation of extended as to employ a great multitude of more than 100,000 men, all accustomed to hands. Humanity may in this case require the use of arms, and many of them to rapine that the freedom of trade should be restored and plunder. The number of vagrants was only by slow gradations, and with a good deal scarce anywhere sensibly increased by it; even of reserve and circumspection. Were those the wages of labour were not reduced by it in high duties and prohibitions taken away all at any occupation, so far as I have been able to once, cheaper foreign goods of the same kind learn, except in that of seamen in the merchant might be poured so fast into the home market, service. But if we compare together the haas to deprive all at once many thousands of bits of a soldier and of any sort of manufacour people of their ordinary employment and turer, we shall find that those of the latter do

not tend so much to disqualify him from being same manner as the latter inflame their workemployed in a new trade, as those of the for- men, to attack with violence and outrage the mer from being employed in any. The ma-proposers of any such regulation; to attempt nufacturer has always been accustomed to to reduce the army would be as dangerous as look for his subsistence from his labour only; it has now become to attempt to diminish, in the soldier to expect it from his pay. Appli- any respect, the monopoly which our manucation and industry have been familiar to the facturers have obtained against us. This moone; idleness and dissipation to the other. nopoly has so much increased the number of But it is surely much easier to change the di- some particular tribes of them, that, like an rection of industry from one sort of labour to overgrown standing army, they have become another, than to turn idleness and dissipation formidable to the government, and, upon mato any. To the greater part of manufactures, ny occasions, intimidate the legislature. The besides, it has already been observed, there are member of parliament who supports every other collateral manufactures of so similar a proposal for strengthening this monopoly, is nature, that a workman can easily transfer his sure to acquire not only the reputation of unindustry from one of them to another. The derstanding trade, but great popularity and greater part of such workmen, too, are occa- influence with an order of men whose numsionally employed in country labour. The bers and wealth render them of great importstock which employed them in a particular ance. If he opposes them, on the contrary, manufacture before, will still remain in the and still more, if he has authority enough to country, to employ an equal number of peo-be able to thwart them, neither the most acple in some other way. The capital of the knowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor country remaining the same, the demand for the greatest public services, can protect him labour will likewise be the same, or very near- from the most infamous abuse and detraction, ly the same, though it may be exerted in dif- from personal insults, nor sometimes from real ferent places, and for different occupations. danger, arising from the insolent outrage of Soldiers and seamen, indeed, when discharged furious and disappointed monopolists. from the king's service, are at liberty to exer- The undertaker of a great manufacture, cise any trade within any town or place of who, by the home markets being suddenly Great Britain or Ireland. Let the same na- laid open to the competition of foreigners, tural liberty of exercising what species of in- should be obliged to abandon his trade, would dustry they please, be restored to all his Ma- no doubt suffer very considerably. That part jesty's subjects, in the same manner as to sol- of his capital which had usually been employdiers and seamen; that is, break down the ex-ed in purchasing materials, and in paying his clusive privileges of corporations, and repeal workmen, might, without much difficulty, perthe statute of apprenticeship, both which are haps, find another employment; but that part really encroachments upon natural liberty, of it which was fixed in workhouses, and in and add to those the repeal of the law of settlements, so that a poor workman, when thrown out of employment, either in one trade or in one place, may seek for it in another trade or in another place, without the fear either of a prosecution or of a removal; and either the public nor the individuals will suffer much more from the occasional disbanding some particular classes of manufacturers, than from that of the soldiers. Our manufacturers have no doubt great merit with their country, but they cannot have more than those who defend it with their blood, nor deserve to be treated with more delicacy.

the instruments of trade, could scarce be disposed of without considerable loss. The equitable regard, therefore, to his interest, requires that changes of this kind should never be introduced suddenly, but slowly, gradually, and after a very long warning. The legislature, were it possible that its deliberations could be always directed, not by the clamorous importunity of partial interests, but by an extensive view of the general good, ought, upon this very account, perhaps, to be particularly careful, neither to establish any new monopolies of this kind, nor to extend further those which are already established. Every To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade such regulation introduces some degree of should ever be entirely restored in Great Bri-real disorder into the constitution of the state, tain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but, what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it.

which it will be difficult afterwards to cure without occasioning another disorder.

How far it may be proper to impose taxes upon the importation of foreign goods, in order not to prevent their importation, but to Were the officers of the army to op- raise a revenue for government, I shall consi.. pose, with the same zeal and unanimity, any der hereafter when I come to treat of taxes. reduction in the number of forces, with which Taxes imposed with a view to prevent, or even master manufacturers set themselves against to diminish importation, are evidently as deevery law that is likely to increase the num-structive of the revenue of the customs as of ber of their rivals in the home market; were the freedom of trade.

the former to animate their soldiers, in the}

CHAP. III.

put an end to almost all fair commerce between the two nations; and smugglers are now the principal importers, either of British goods into France, or of French goods into Great Britain. The principles which I have been

OF THE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINTS UPON
THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS OF ALMOST examining, in the foregoing chapter, took
ALL KINDS, FROM THOSE COUNTRIES WITH
WHICH THE BALANCE IS SUPPOSED TO BE

DISADVANTAGEOUS.

PART I. Of the Unreasonableness of those
Restraints, even upon the Principles of the
Commercial System.

their origin from private interest and the spirit of monopoly; those which I am going to examine in this, from national prejudice and animosity. They are, accordingly, as might well be expected, still more unreasonable. They are so, even upon the principles of the commercial system.

better and cheaper than those of Portugal, or its linens than those of Germany, it would be more advantageous for Great Britain to purchase both the wine and the foreign linen which it had occasion for of France, than of Portugal and Germany. Though the value

First, Though it were certain that in the To lay extraordinary restraints upon the im- case of a free trade between France and Engportation of goods of almost all kinds, from land, for example, the balance would be in those particular countries with which the ba- favour of France, it would by no means follance of trade is supposed to be disadvanta- low that such a trade would be disadvantageous, is the second expedient by which the geous to England, or that the general balance commercial system proposes to increase the of its whole trade would thereby be turned quantity of gold and silver. Thus, in Great more against it. If the wines of France are Britain, Silesia lawns may be imported for home consumption, upon paying certain duties; but French cambrics and lawns are prohibited to be imported, except into the port of London, there to be warehoused for exportation. Higher duties are imposed upon the wines of France than upon those of Por- of the annual importations from France would tugal, or indeed of any other country. By what is called the impost 1692, a duty of fiveand-twenty per cent. of the rate or value, was laid upon all French goods; while the goods of other nations were, the greater part of them, subjected to much lighter duties, seldom exceeding five per cent. The wine, brandy, salt, and vinegar of France, were indeed ex-in Great Britain. cepted; these commodities being subjected to But, Secondly, A great part of them might other heavy duties, either by other laws, or by particular clauses of the same law. In 1696, a second duty of twenty-five per cent. the first not having been thought a sufficient discouragement, was imposed upon all French goods, except brandy; together with a new duty of five-and-twenty pounds upon the ton of French wine, and another of fifteen pounds upon the ton of French vinegar. French goods have ver, the re-exportation of a part of them to never been omitted in any of those general subsidies or duties of five per cent. which have been imposed upon all, or the greater part, of the goods enumerated in the book of rates. If we count the one-third and two-third subsidies as making a complete subsidy between them, there have been five of these general countries. Some part even of the French wine subsidies; so that, before the commencement of the present war, seventy-five per cent. may be considered as the lowest duty to which the greater part of the goods of the growth, produce, or manufacture of France, were liable. But upon the greater part of goods, those duties are equivalent to a prohibition. The French, in their turn, have, I believe, treated our goods and manufactures just as hardly; though I am not so well acquainted with the particular hardships which they have imposed upon them. Those mutual restraints have

thereby be greatly augmented, the value of the whole annual importations would be diminished, in proportion as the French goods of the same quality were cheaper than those of the other two countries. This would be the case, even upon the supposition that the whole French goods imported were to be consumed

be re-exported to other countries, where, being sold with profit, they might bring back a return. equal in value, perhaps, to the prime cost of the whole French goods imported. What has frequently been said of the East India trade, might possibly be true of the French; that though the greater part of East India goods were bought with gold and sil

other countries brought back more gold and silver to that which carried on the trade, than the prime cost of the whole amounted to. One of the most important branches of the Dutch trade at present, consists in the carriage of French goods to other European

drank in Great Britain, is clandestinely imported from Holland and Zealand. If there was either a free trade between France and England, or if French goods could be imported upon paying only the same duties as those of other European nations, to be drawn back upon exportation, England might have some share of a trade which is found so advantageous to Holland.

Thirdly, and lastly, There is no certain criterion by which we can determine on which side what is called the balance between any

two countries lies, or which of them exports of debt and credit between England and Holto the greatest value. National prejudice and land will not be regulated entirely by the oranimosity, prompted always by the private in- dinary course of the dealings of those two terest of particular traders, are the principles countries with one another, but will be influwhich generally direct our judgment upon all enced by that of the dealings in England with questions concerning it. There are two cri- those other places. England may be obliged terions, however, which have frequently been to send out every year money to Holland, appealed to upon such occasions, the custom-though its annual exports to that country may house books and the course of exchange. The exceed very much the annual value of its imcustom-house books, I think, it is now gene- ports from thence, and though what is called rally acknowledged, are a very uncertain cri- the balance of trade may be very much in terion, on account of the inaccuracy of the favour of England. valuation at which the greater part of goods are rated in them. The course of exchange is, perhaps, almost equally so.

In the way, besides, in which the par of exchange has hitherto been computed, the ordinary course of exchange can afford no sufficient indication that the ordinary state of debt and credit is in favour of that country which seems to have, or which is supposed to have, the ordinary course of exchange in its favour; or, in other words, the real exchange may be, and in fact often is, so very different from the computed one, that, from the course of the latter, no certain conclusion can, upon many

When the exchange between two places, such as London and Paris, is at par, it is said to be a sign that the debts due from London to Paris are compensated by those due from Paris to London. On the contrary, when a premium is paid at London for a bill upon Paris, it is said to be a sign that the debts due from London to Paris are not compensated by those due from Paris to London, but occasions, be drawn concerning that of the that a balance in money must be sent out former. from the latter place; for the risk, trouble, and expense, of exporting which, the premium is both demanded and given. But the ordinary state of debt and credit between those two cities must necessarily be regulated, it is said, by the ordinary course of their dealings with one another. When neither of them imports from the other to a greater amount than it exports to that other, the debts and credits of each may compensate one another. But when one of them imports from the other to a greater value than it exports to that other, the former necessarily becomes indebted to the latter in a greater sum than the latter becomes indebted to it: the debts and credits of each do not compensate one another, and money must be sent out from that place of which the debts overbalance the credits. The ordinary course of exchange, therefore, being an indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between two places, must likewise be an indication of the ordinary course of their exports and imports, as these necessarily regulate that state.

When for a sum of money paid in England, containing, according to the standard of the English mint, a certain number of ounces of pure silver, you receive a bill for a sum of money to be paid in France, containing, according to the standard of the French mint, an equal number of ounces of pure silver, exchange is said to be at par between England and France. When you pay more, you are supposed to give a premium, and exchange is said to be against England, and in favour of France. When you pay less, you are supposed to get a premium, and exchange is said to be against France, and in favour of England.

But, first, We cannot always judge of the value of the current money of different countries by the standard of their respective mints. In some it is more, in others it is less worn, clipt, and otherwise degenerated from that standard. But the value of the current coin of every country, compared with that of any other country, is in proportion, not to the quantity of pure silver which it ought to con

But though the ordinary course of exchange tain, but to that which it actually does conshall be allowed to be a sufficient indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between any two places, it would not from thence follow, that the balance of trade was in favour of that place which had the ordinary state of debt and credit in its favour. The ordinary state of debt and credit between any two places is not always entirely regulated by the ordinary course of their dealings with one another, but is often influenced by that of the dealings of either with many other places. If it is usual, for example, for the merchants of England to pay for the goods which they buy of Hamburg, Dantzic, Riga, &c. by bills upon Holland, the ordinary state

tain. Before the reformation of the silver coin in King William's time, exchange between England and Holland, computed in the usual manner, according to the standard of their respective mints, was five-and-twenty per cent. against England. But the value of the current coin of England, as we learn from Mr Lowndes, was at that time rather more than five-and-twenty per cent. below its stand. ard value. The real exchange, therefore, may even at that time have been in favour of England, notwithstanding the computed exchange was so much against it; a smaller number of ounces of pure silver, actually paid in England, may have purchased a bill for a greater

N

number of ounces of pure silver to be paid in | of Amsterdam, for example, are of more va Holland, and the man who was supposed to lue than a thousand guilders of Amsterdam give, may in reality have got the premium. The French coin was, before the late reformation of the English gold coin, much less wore than the English, and was perhaps two or three per cent, nearer its standard. If the computed exchange with France, therefore, was not more than two or three per cent. against England, the real exchange might have been in its favour. Since the reformation of the gold coin, the exchange has been constantly in favour of England, and against France.

Secondly, In some countries the expense of coinage is defrayed by the government; in others, it is defrayed by the private people, who carry their bullion to the mint, and the government even derives some revenue from the coinage. In England it is defrayed by the government; and if you carry a pound weight of standard silver to the mint, you get back sixty-two shillings, containing a pound weight of the like standard silver. In France a duty of eight per cent. is deducted for the coinage, which not only defrays the expense of it, but affords a small revenue to the government. In England, as the coinage costs nothing, the current coin can never be much more valuable than the quantity of bullion which it actually contains. In France, the workmanship, as you pay for it, adds to the value, in the same manner as to that of wrought plate. A sum of French money, therefore, containing an equal weight of pure silver, is more valuable than a sum of English money Containing an equal weight of pure silver, and must require more bullion, or other commodities, to purchase it. Though the current coin of the two countries, therefore, were equally near the standards of their respective mints, a sum of English money could not well purchase a sum of French money containing an equal number of ounces of pure silver, nor, consequently, a bill upon France for such a

sum.

If, for such a bill, no more additional money was paid than what was sufficient to compensate the expense of the French coinage, the real exchange might be at par between the two countries; their debts and credits might mutually compensate one another, while the computed exchange was considerably in favour of France. If less than this was paid, the real exchange might be in favour of England, while the computed was in favour of France.

Thirdly, and lastly, In some places, as at Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, &c. foreign bills of exchange are paid in what they call bank money; while in others, as at London, Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, &c. they are paid in the common currency of the country. What is called bank money, is always of more value than the same nominal sum of common currency. A thousand guilders in the bank

currency. The difference between them is called the agio of the bank, which at Amsterdam is generally about five per cent. Supposing the current money of the two countries equally near to the standard of their respective mints, and that the one pays foreign bills in this common currency, while the other pays them in bank money, it is evident that the computed exchange may be in favour of that which pays in bank money, though the real exchange should be in favour of that which pays in current money; for the same reason that the computed exchange may be in favour of that which pays in better money, or in money nearer to its own standard, though the real exchange should be in favour of that which pays in worse. The computed exchange, before the late reformation of the gold coin, was generally against London with Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, and, I believe, with all other places which pay in what is called bank money. It will by no means follow, however, that the real exchange was against it. Since the reformation of the gold coin, it has been in favour of London, even with those places. The computed exchange has generally been in favour of London with Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, and, if you except France, I believe with most other parts of Europe that pay in common currency; and it is not improbable that the real exchange was so too.

Digression concerning Banks of Deposit, particularly concerning that of Amsterdam.

THE currency of a great state, such as France or England, generally consists almost entirely of its own coin. Should this currency, therefore, be at any time worn, clipt, or otherwise degraded below its standard value, the state, by a reformation of its coin, can effectually re-establish its currency. But the currency of a small state, such as Genoa or Hamburg, can seldom consist altogether in its own coin, but must be made up, in a great measure, of the coins of all the neighbouring states with which its inhabitants have a continual intercourse. Such a state, therefore, by reforming its coin, will not always be able to reform its currency. If foreign bills of exchange are paid in this currency, the uncertain value of any sum, of what is in its own nature so uncertain, must render the exchange always very much against such a state, its currency being in all foreign states necessarily valued even below what it is worth.

In order to remedy the inconvenience to which this disadvantageous exchange must have subjected their merchants, such small states, when they began to attend to the interest of trade, have frequently enacted, that

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