The American Economic Review, Volume 93,Edição 5American Economic Association, 2003 |
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Página 1479
... price level and nominal demand of money ; P + 1 is the price level that agents expect for next period . Money supply is driven by the need to fi- nance seignorage . On the other hand , govern- ment's concern about current levels of ...
... price level and nominal demand of money ; P + 1 is the price level that agents expect for next period . Money supply is driven by the need to fi- nance seignorage . On the other hand , govern- ment's concern about current levels of ...
Página 1525
... price level ; thus higher m means a more expansionary monetary policy . The fiscal authority chooses a policy variable x ; a larger x means a larger subsidy and a more expansionary fiscal policy . These policies affect the GDP level y ...
... price level ; thus higher m means a more expansionary monetary policy . The fiscal authority chooses a policy variable x ; a larger x means a larger subsidy and a more expansionary fiscal policy . These policies affect the GDP level y ...
Página 1533
... price level ; hence , discretionary fiscal policy is subopti- mally contractionary . When the fiscal authority leads , it anticipates the price - conservativeness of the monetary authority and runs an even tighter fiscal policy than ...
... price level ; hence , discretionary fiscal policy is subopti- mally contractionary . When the fiscal authority leads , it anticipates the price - conservativeness of the monetary authority and runs an even tighter fiscal policy than ...
Índice
Editor | 1448 |
DANIEL KAHNEMAN | 1449 |
President | 1463 |
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analysis average bank distress bank failures behavior biodiversity borrowing capital ceiling changes choice cigarettes coefficients commitment consumption correlation costs credit card currency d₁ d₂ deadweight losses debt domestic dummy Economic Review effect empirical endogenous equation equilibrium estimates example expectations Figure firms fiscal authority fiscal policy function hedonic hedonic regression heterogeneity household hyperinflations implies in-service days income increase indicator indicator variables individual inflation interaction interest rate issuers Journal juvenile crime Kahneman loans measure member banks ment monetary policy moral hazard Nash Nash equilibrium nomic observations optimal output panic paper parameters pension wealth percent period population predictions pregnancy rational expectations regression relative reported sample Section seignorage SERPS shocks significant smoking social specification statistically Table tacit collusion tacitly collude taxes Tiebout Tiebout model tion trend U.S. dollar variables violent crime wage