place in science. "Experimental philosophers," says Mr. Mill, "usually give the name of empirical laws to those uniformities which observation or experiment has shown to exist, but upon which they hesitate to rely in cases varying much from those which have been actually observed, for want of seeing any reason why such a law should exist. It is implied, therefore, in the notion of an empirical law, that it is not an ultimate law; that if true at all, its truth is capable of being, or requires to be accounted for. It is a derivative law, the derivation of which is not yet known. To state the explanation, the why of the empirical law, would be to state the laws from which it is derived, the ultimate causes upon which it is contingent. And if we knew these, we should also know what are its limits, under what conditions it would cease to be fulfilled. . . Now it is the very nature of a derivative law, which has not yet been resolved into its elements, in other words, an empirical law, that we do not know whether it results from the different effects of one cause, or from effects of different causes. We can not tell whether it depends wholly upon laws, or partly upon laws and partly upon collocation. . . Empirical laws, until explained, and connected with the ultimate laws from which they result, have not attained the highest degree of certainty of which laws are susceptible." But the following is, as we think, what more particularly applies to the present subject: "The property which philosophers usually consider as characteristic of empirical laws, is that of being unfit to be relied on beyond the limits of time, place, and circumstances, in which the observations have been made. These are empirical laws in a more emphatic sense. . . Until a uniformity can be taken out of the class of empirical laws, and brought either into that of causation, or of the demonstrated [scientific] results of the laws of causation, it can not with any assurance be pronounced true beyond the local and other limits within which it has been found so by actual observation."

Both the novelty and importance of the position here taken, demand some exposition. If it be well authorized, true in fact, for the purpose we have in view, it can not be too well understood. When Free-Trade economists have arrogated the high and dignified title of a science for their theme, one naturally asks, what sort of a science is it? In what is its artificial structure apparent? Where are the principles and rules by which we arrive at infallible conclusions? A science, well and truly formed, can predict results with certainty; it is the very nature of science to do this, and any

pretension of this kind that fails in its predictions, is thereby proved false. Have the laws of public economy ever yet been so adjusted as to produce this result?-Manifestly not. If they had, all the world would have known it, and there would be no controversy. The truth is, the whole subject still remains a wide field of empirical laws, not entirely useless, but yet unadjusted as to scientific order and relations, having not the slightest claim to the dignity of a science. If any should think we have failed in our classification of the laws of public economy, in their historical condition down to this time, as being empirical, let them tell us under what category of dogmas they should be ranked; or let them say, if they choose, that they do not all belong to this class. We are not tenacious on that point. We only say, they have never yet been reduced to a science. That is evident, because there is no certainty of science. in them. There is no uncertainty in figures, in mathematics, in geometry, in astronomy, or in the physical sciences generally, so far as their respective domains have been explored; nor is there uncertainty in any science, the elements of which have been ascer tained and adjusted in scientific order and relations. There can be none. It is the very nature of science to realize its predictions. We do not affirm confidently, that all the dogmas which ever have been uttered on public economy, will fall within the logician's definition of empirical laws; but we think they will generally be found there; nor can we conceive how a more respectable rank could fairly be assigned to them. It is not simply for the convenience of classification, that we have put them there; but because we could not find a more legitimate place.

Now, let us consider what the characteristic of an empirical law is, as presented in the above citation: "The property of being unfit to be relied on beyond the limits of time, place, and circumstance, in which the observations have been made." It may not always be so good as this; but it can not be better. It must be seen, therefore, that it entirely cuts off the generalizations of Free Trade, and falls directly in the line of our definition. No law of public economy can be safely trusted except for "the time, place, and circumstance, in which the observations have been made;" that is, the observations which have established the law. The principle necessarily restricts every system of public economy to one nation to that nation where the observations that have dictated its laws, have been made. Within these limits empirical laws may be serviceable, and by proper attention may be reduced to

a science. For a wider range, it is not possible that a science should be made of them on this subject. In the language of Mr. Mill, in a citation under the former head, it is not simply "absurd, but abstractedly impossible."

The effect of this new position, if it shall be allowed to be well sustained, is obvious. Dislodged from the platform of the sciences, on which they have always claimed to stand, and which was their sole authority, the Free-Trade economists are utterly discomfited. None, we think, can fail to see, after what has been proved above, that the pretensions of Free Trade to the rights and authority of a science, are perfectly absurd.

3. We now propose to notice, as another new feature of this work, that we have endeavored to subject its propositions, so far as they relate to the main question in debate, to the most rigid test of the recognised canons of experimental induction, as laid down by logicians; and consequently, that, in this particular, and so far as we may be allowed to have succeeded, the subject will, perhaps, have some claim to be regarded as rescued from the field of empirical laws, and installed in the position of a science.

We cite the canons, thus employed, from Mr. Mill, as follow:1. "If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause or effect of the given phenomenon.

2. "If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phe

nomenon.

3. "If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance; the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon.

4. "Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known, by previous inductions, to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents.

5. "Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever an

other phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation."

"These methods," says Mr. Mill," are the only possible modes of experimental inquiry, of direct induction a posteriori, as distinguished from deduction. At least, I know not, nor am I able to conceive, any others. These, then, with such assistance as can be obtained from deduction, compose the available resources of the human mind for ascertaining the laws of the succession of phenomena."

Mr. Mill has demonstrated at large the truth of these canons. Any one who chooses to refer to the demonstration, will find it complete and satisfactory, beyond the possibility of error.

We have not introduced these canons here because we expect to find room to make and explain their application along with the current of the argument where they apply; but merely to suggest a recognised test, the authority of which will not be questioned, and which can be employed as such by those who are already versed in these rules, or who will take the trouble to make themselves acquainted with their application. Having already shown that public economy has never yet been reduced to a science, and as that object would turn us entirely aside from the specific design of this work, except as an incidental effect which may possibly in some degree be achieved, we are forced to decline a task which would of itself occupy the sole attention of a properly-endowed and properly-qualified mind, in a work not less extensive, perhaps, than that to which we are limited in an endeavor to develop the practical parts of this science. We conceive that the construction of this science is unoccupied ground, a field yet to be entered by some one, whose talents may qualify, and whose ambition may prompt, him to so laudable an undertaking. All that we profess is, that we have taken these canons as our rule in the construction of the main argument of this work, and that we have been essen tially aided by their light shining on our path.

We for a long time thought that public economy never could be made a science in the strict sense of the term. But that position can hardly be maintained, if it be allowed that everything is a subject of science, and capable of being brought into its place as such; and if, moreover, it be considered, that it is a part of science to adapt itself to the nature of the subject. A science of contingent propositions, for aught that can be seen, is as supposable as one of

uniform and immutable propositions. The propositions of public economy, as we hold, must necessarily change with a change of data; and it can not be denied, that such changes are constantly transpiring in every commonwealth. It will be found that this principle of a liability to a change of data, presents itself on the threshold, and that it lies at the foundation of the science of public economy. It is impossible to cast it aside, or turn the back upon it, with any hope of a successful investigation, or useful result. A public measure required at one time, may, by events, or even by its own operation in the complete fulfilment of its purpose, require to be modified, or suspended, or superseded, at a subsequent period; and the same measure may be of the greatest importance to one nation, which would be injurious to another, possibly to all others. Nothing can be more contingent than the propositions of public economy.

If it should be said that a science must be of universal use, to establish its claim as such, it will be observed that we do not insist on the admission of this branch of knowledge to that rank, if it can not fairly be established in that place. We do, however, maintain, that it has never yet arrived at that position. We also think that it may be brought there; and we beg leave to suggest, in answer to the requirement of the attribute of universal application in a science, that it is not yet concluded to be wanting in this case. One of the conditions of this science, as already demonstrated, is, that every nation wishing to avail itself of its benefits, must look for its elements in the facts of its own history, and nowhere else. In that way it becomes of universal use, when every nation, for itself, shall have constructed its own system of public economy on the basis of its own experience. So far, therefore, is the abovenamed objection from proving that public economy can not be a science, as a contingent structure, or as a system composed of contingent propositions, it may be seen, that its very nature is of this precise description; in other words, it is a science adapted to the nature of the subject. It would be absurd to require that one science should prove another. It is sufficient if each one proves itself, and vindicates its own position.

It must be admitted, that nothing is more desirable, in public economy, than that the certainties of science should be brought to bear upon it; and nothing is more evident than that, hitherto, they have never been so directed. The reasons are obvious, as shown in our citations, here and there, from Mr. Mill. It was impossible