to communicate directly as to them with commanders of unified and specified commands. All directives and communications of the Assistant Secretary to such commands, the military departments or the Military Assistance Advisory Groups, which pertain to military assistance affairs and have strategic or military operational implications, shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Conversely, all Joint Chiefs of Staff directives and communications to the unified and specified commands, the military departments or the Military Assistance Advisory Groups, which pertain to military assistance affairs, shall be coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). C. The Secretaries of the military departments, their civilian assistants, and the military personnel in such departments shall fully cooperate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) and his staff in a continuous effort to achieve efficient administration of the Department of Defense and to carry out effectively the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense. V. Authorities A. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), in the course of exercising full staff functions, is hereby specifically delegated authority to: 1. Issue instructions and one-time directive-type memoranda, in writing, appropriate to carrying out policies approved by the Secretary of Defense for his assigned field of responsibility in accordance with DOD Dir. 5025.1. Such instructions and memoranda to the military departments will be issued through the Secretaries of those departments or their designees. 2. Make requests to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Joint Chiefs of Staff action or advice on matters in the Assistant Secretary's assigned field of responsibility. 3. Obtain such reports and information (in accordance with provisions of DOD Dir. 7700.1 and 5158.1) and assistance from the military departments and other Department of Defense agencies as may be necessary to the performance of his assigned functions. B. Other authorities specifically delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) in other directives will be referenced in an inclosure to this directive. VI. Cancellation DOD Directive 5132.2, dated February 27, 1959, subject: same as above, is hereby canceled. VII. Effective date This Directive is effective upon publication. ROSWELL GILPATRIC, Deputy Secretary of Defense. REFERENCE TO OTHER AUTHORITIES SPECIFICALLY DELEGATED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) IN OTHER DIRECTIVES 1. Authority to take necessary action with respect to the strategic security trade controls on foreign excess personal property as prescribed in DOD Directive 2030.2, dated March 10, 1961. 2. Authority to act for the Secretary of Defense in military assistance matters as prescribed in DOD Directive 5132.3, dated July 8, 1963. 3. Authority to certify use of Foreign Assistance Act funds for offshore procurement as prescribed in DOD Directive 2125.1, dated December 5, 1963. 4. Authority to act for the Secretary of Defense in (1) determining, with respect to defense articles in approved Military Assistance Programs, that it is necessary to furnish such articles in the absence of the certification of aid-recipients' capability to use MAP equipment required by Section 513 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; and (2) giving specific advance approval to the furnishing of such defense articles, pursuant to Secretary of Defense memorandum dated February 3, 1965. The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to take advantage of you, but one thing that amazes me is how anyone could come in an attend to all these duties suddenly. I assume these directors, many of them, will stay on duty and there will be a continuity through them of all these responsibilities. Do you know about that, Doctor? STATEMENT OF G. WARREN NUTTER, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) Dr. NUTTER. Mr. Chairman, I have not really had a chance to make any decisions on that. The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking that you be committed to any particular position, but that you have a chance to deal with these problems. It is a monumental task that is put before you. To give us some idea, do you have a prepared statement, Doctor? It is all right if you do not have. Dr. NUTTER. I would be pleased, Mr. Chairman, to The CHAIRMAN. No, you do not have to have it. Dr. NUTTER. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. That will be in the record. Could you tell the committee how you view the functions of this office and what particular policies you intend to pursue? That is a broad, sweeping question and it is revealing to me to make a study here of the broad responsibilities you do have. These Vietnam policies, for instance. According to the record as I read it here, you are to have a key role, or an opportunity for a key role in that. Give us some idea of how you expect to approach these responsibilities. Dr. NUTTER. Mr. Chairman, I am very well aware of the heavy responsibilities of this post for which I have been designated and I would, of course, do my very best to fulfill those responsibilities. I am mindful of the obligations to this body and to the American public to speak frankly and reveal my opinions on matters, in particular to the Secretary of Defense in his more awesome responsibilities, since I am his principal assistant. I have not, of course, had an opportunity to consider as carefully as I should what all of the responsibilities entail and how they would need to be reorganized. This particular office has been subject over time to reorganization in order to attempt to fulfill them. As you are all aware, members of this committee and others in public, the National Security Council is now being restructured and the operations are being changed. A lot of the very important functions of my office will be to supply information into the National Security Council system which will be useful in formulating the policies of the United States as they respect national security. I will, of course, if confirmed by the Senate, give most careful attention to the question of who would be the best deputies to carry on the tasks that are before us and I would hope and expect that there would be significant continuity so that there would be no sudden break in this most vital function. I am not, of course, unfortunately, in a position, since I am still a private citizen and have not been exposed to privileged information, to expose in detail exactly what I would hope to do. The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to make a stand now on keeping any particular plan. I do not have any in mind. I am just speaking of the problem of continuity. You will be given under this DOD directive the principal support for the Department of Defense for participation in National Security Council affairs. That means, as I understand it, that the main matters that come before the National Security Council from the Department of Defense will be matters that you supply for them and direct in to them. Now, how do you propose to meet that problem? Dr. NUTTER. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that I am, of course, the person who is responsible for what leaves this office. There is a staff that is established and has been in operation whose primary function is to make such studies as are required to fulfill the obligations for national security. This staff very carefully coordinates its results, its findings, its recommendations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with other important elements of the Defense Department. Then, of course, ultimately, I, in the position of the Assistant Secretary, bear the responsibility to the Secretary to make sure to the best of my ability that these are the best possible proposals that can be forwarded. The CHAIRMAN. You have the duty here for the coordination of defense policies and plans for international, political, military, and foreign economic affairs, including disarmament policy guidance over military missions and Department of Defense representation in international organizations. Now, do you interrupt that to include the policies in the war in Vietnam? Dr. NUTTER. Well, sir, I am sure that the Department of Defense must play a role in making its proposals to the National Security Council on issues of this matter and certainly Vietnam is a very important problem for the country at the moment. It is perhaps the most critical national security problem. Of course, as we all know, the President of the United States bears the responsibility for determining foreign policy and our role is to give the very best advice that we can in these matters. I will hope that we would be able to do so if I am confirmed for the position. The CHAIRMAN. I believe in everyone having the chance, the President and you and everyone else, to perform. I am not going to try to move in on you now and tell you what to think or believe. But I know the President has always depended on what those closest around him tell him and recommend, because he cannot possibly have personal knowledge of more than a small percent of the facts that go to make his decision. Do you have in mind now something that you wanted to recommend about the policy in the war? Dr. NUTTER. No, sir. The CHAIRMAN. I do not know if you ought to go into it, but I thought if you were going to tell somebody else what your policies are, you had better tell us, too. Dr. NUTTER. Mr. Chairman, I wish I could immediately issue some advice on this matter, but I feel that in view of the fact that I have not had an opportunity to review at all very detailed privileged information on this subject, and in view of the fact that there are very delicate negotiations in process in Paris at the moment, in view of the sensitive nature of my position, I believe it would be somewhat irresponsible if I were to state before this committee my views as a private citizen which are not informed views in the fullest sense and might in some way jeopardize what's underway at the moment. The CHAIRMAN. I think you have given a good answer. I wanted to bring the subject up, as I have said. I think that is a good answer. Now, here is a matter that you are going to be right in the middle of as I understand. One of the main duties of your office concerns military assistance programs. For the information of the committee, the funds over which this office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, has control might be summarized as follows. This is the money: For fiscal 1969, the current year, the total obligational authorities for the military assistance program, $451 million; sales of military arms, $296 million; then O. & M. for office expense, $1,400,000, a total of $748,400,000. Now, that is almost three-quarters of a billion dollars, Mr. Secretary. Do you have any policy or fixed ideas about this subject that I have just mentioned? Dr. NUTTER. No; sir, Mr. Chairman. Again, I feel that I am not sufficiently well informed on these matters to make a definitive statement. I am aware of the vast size of this undertaking and the importance of it. I believe it has been, as far as I can see in my initial inspections, very ably administered. There is a large force of capable professional people who are doing their best to fulfill the obligations that are placed upon them. As I understand it, this policy and the use of these funds is determined through a separate budget appropriation in the Congress and the office must, of course, prepare to the best of its ability again the proposals that it thinks are most in consonance with our national security objectives. But at this moment, I feel I am just not in a position, much as I wish I were, to suggest any changes. The CHAIRMAN. You will find that the law is very broad indeed authorizing these activities, that the appropriations sometimes may have a limitation or two on them, but generally, there is a vast amount of discretion in this field. It depends upon the emphasis and the outlook in great part of the man who has the responsibility. I personally supported these MAAG programs to a great degree, but I think they need a rigid review and we have overdone it in cases. So I want to ask you this: Will you make the full-scale review, gain the facts first, as best you can, and make a full-scale review of this military assistance program? Dr. NUTTER. Mr. Chairman, I can assure the committee that if I am confirmed, I will make an intensive review of all operations of that office and will pay particular attention to this one because it is one which involves a large outflow of funds and one must decide whether or not this is the best use. The CHAIRMAN. You consider that one of your major responsibilities; is that correct? Dr. NUTTER. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. The sale of military arms is something that is a very broad subject. I think it needs your personal attention. Do you expect to give it your personal attention? Dr. NUTTER. I do, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. And make firm recommendations about it? Dr. NUTTER. Yes, sir. There are already some reorganization plans underway as I understand it in this area. The CHAIRMAN. You have a distinguished background and have a fine reputation as an economist as well as an educator. I am not trying to pick to pieces things that you have written or said in the past, but the committee has had inquiry about an interview you gave out in 1967 which tended to question the policy of peaceful coexistence. That has 26-069-69- 3 a relative meaning itself, peaceful coexistence. But I wanted to call that to your attention and if you did question that, you were not opposing any negotiations or consultations between the United States and Russia to probe and see, if possible, to find some basis of agreement on some matters, I assume. Is that right? I wish you would comment on that as you see fit. Dr. NUTTER. Yes, sir; Mr. Chairman. I have always been in favor of efforts to negotiate with those who have been confronting us in the past in a very unfortunate manner and have threatened our national security. I have believed that those negotiations should be carried on in a hard-headed pragmatic manner. This requires that there be an interchange and exchange quid pro quo. This particular comment on the question of peaceful coexistence, what I had in mind was the Russian meaning of the term and was attempting to explain our interpretation of it, the fact that it could not mean precisely what it seemed to. The CHAIRMAN. Members of the committee, I have run overtime here, but I feel that those questions were largely for the committee, not for me. Senator Smith, may I call on you now? Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I share your concern in this area of our defense and want to share your observations and your questions. I have no questions myself. The CHAIRMAN. For the time being, we will call on Senator Inouye and get back to Senator Young. Senator Inouye, do you have any questions? Senator INOUYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Nutter, I gather that you will be the chief adviser to our Secretary on matters relating to international politics and economics and specifically on matters relating to disarmament and arms control, according to the chairman's recital of your duties. Recently, the Secretary of State indicated in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee that he would wish that this Government would enter into discussions with the Russians on the reduction of offensive and defensive missiles before considering the establishment of the ABM system. Two days later, the Secretary of Defense appeared before the same committee and indicated that he would prefer to proceed with the establishment of the ABM system even before discussions. I am not certain whether you are ready to advise the Secretary, but how would you advise the Secretary of Defense as to entering negotiations? Dr. NUTTER. Senator, again, on this matter as on so many, I feel very uneasy about making any immediate statements as to what I would advise, simply because I am not aware of the complexities involved in these negotiations. They are very delicate matters. I would not know what the timing should be at this point. I believe, as I have interpreted Secretary Laird's statement, it was to the effect that in his opinion, proceeding with the ABM system would not be inconsistent with also having discussions on strategic arms limitations. My own view, of course, is that we ought to take every opening that we have to see how to meaningfully employ meaningful negotiations to this end. The exact timing, I think, is a matter of very delicate concern and there are no doubt considerations that I am not aware of that will affect this. |