'happiness' merely as another name for the
highest good. But, even were it still the case, as
it was in the time of Aristotle, that nearly all men
were agreed as to the name of the highest good,
and that the common people and the cultured alike
called it happiness, the difference as to what they
meant by the term would still remain.
To say
that the ethical end is happiness is, to use Locke's
terminology, a "trifling proposition"; for in so
doing we merely give it a name 1-and one which
the controversies of philosophy have surrounded
with confusion. That the end is happiness in any
definite sense, for example, as the greatest balance
of pleasure over pain, may be perfectly true, but
stands very much in need of proof. That happi-
ness is the highest ethical end can be assumed as
true only when 'happiness' is nothing more than an
abbreviated expression for 'the highest ethical end.'

new point of

A difficulty of a more radical kind meets us, at (b) implies a the very outset of our enquiry, in the distinctively view, ethical notion expressed by the word 'ought.' Various attempts have been made to surmount or circumvent this difficulty; and some of these will come under consideration in the sequel. The very point of view, and yet holds that "happiness is not to be desired for its own sake."-Lectures and Essays (1879), ii. 121, 173.

1 "Auch dieser Begriff [Glückseligkeit] ist an sich ein bloss formaler, der jede beliebige materiale Bestimmung zulässt."Zeller, Ueber Begriff und Begründung der sittlichen Gesetze in Vorträge und Abhandlungen, iii. 209.

the transi

tion to which

notion of conscious activity contains the idea of
bringing about something which does not yet exist.
It involves a purpose and selects the means for
fulfilling that purpose. The notion 'ought,' it is
true, means more than this: it implies an obligation
to pursue a definite end or conform to definite
rules, regarded generally as coming from an authori-
tative source.
In this clear and full sense, 'ought-
ness' or duty is a comparatively recent notion,
foreign to the classical period of Greek ethics. The
force and definiteness belonging to the modern
conception are due to the juridical aspect which the
Stoic philosophy, Roman law, and Christian theology
combined to impress upon morality. But even the
notion of purpose or end implies a 'preference' of
the end sought: the state to be realised is looked
upon as 'better' or 'more to be desired' than the
existing state. We may ask for the reason of this
superior desirableness; but the answer must soon
fall back upon the assertion of something held to
be desirable in itself. The question which we are
always asking, and cannot help asking, 'Why is such
and such an end to be pursued by me?' or 'Why
ought I to follow such and such a course of
conduct?' must soon lead to the assertion of an
ultimate end, an end whose worth or goodness does
not depend upon any further result, but is intrinsic.
This end, therefore, is not to be sought for some
ulterior end, nor desired simply as a means to

vestigation;

satisfy some other desire. But it is still necessary requires into enquire into the way in which the end, held to be intrinsically good or worthy of attainment, stands related to the constitution of man and his environment. And the question to which I would draw attention, as the fundamental problem of ethics, is, What is that which men have variously called happiness, the highest good, the ethical end? and, in particular, How is the determination of this ethical end connected with the conceptions arrived at by theoretical philosophy? No assumption is made, at starting, as to the nature of this end, or the manner of arriving at it. It may be a transient state of feeling, or a permanent type of character; or it may by its very nature defy exact definition, -the idea itself being perfected as its realisation is progressively approached. In any case it requires to be brought into connexion with the ultimate conceptions about reality.

This question of the ethical end or of the good is thus fundamental in ethics, and with it all other ethical questions are related in such a way that they depend upon it for their full understanding. But it is easy to see that this question does not cover the whole field, and that the other points of view already referred to have a legitimate application. Ethics has not only to determine the end, but to apply it to practice, and so to decide as to what is right or wrong in particular actions,

(c) distinct

from other ethical questions:

and virtuous or vicious in character. And, in addition to the two question thus implied-the question as to the ethical end, and that as to the application of it to practical affairs—there is another department of enquiry which has had a place assigned to it in most ethical systems, and which has a right to be regarded as belonging to ethics. We may investigate the place, in the individual and the community respectively, both of the sentiments and ideas and of the social institutions and customs through which morality is manifested; and this enquiry covers the twofold ground of what may be called moral psychology and moral sociology.

Of these three questions, the first forms the subject of enquiry in the following pages. It seems to me that a great part of the obscurity which surrounds ethical argument is due to confounding these different questions. It is true that no one of them is without bearing on the others; but it is none the less necessary, in discussing any one of them, to keep its distinctness from those others well in view. In enquiring into the nature and grounds of the ethical end, I do not intend to develop a code of rules for practical conduct or a theory of human virtue; nor shall I attempt to trace the origin and nature of moral sentiments and ideas, or of the social institutions and customs connected with morality. If these subjects have to be introduced at

all, it will be only in so far as they may be thought to decide, or tend to decide, the question more immediately in view.

quiry into

of ethics.

Thus it forms no part of the present enquiry to (a) from enfollow out the application to conduct of different the methods ethical ends, or to exhibit the different practical systems to which different ends naturally lead. It might seem indeed, at first sight, as if the development of their practical consequences might solve the question as to the nature of the ends themselves. If we assume certain possible and primá facie reasonable ethical ends, and then see what codes of morality they will yield, surely (it may be thought) that one which affords the most consistent and harmonious code for the guidance of life will be the end to be sought in preference to all others. But, in order that the criticism of the 'methods' of Limitation ethics may be able to answer the question as to the enquiry end or principle of ethics, certain conditions would first have to be complied with. In the first place, (aa) from it would be necessary that the ends or principles investigat whose applications to conduct were to be examined ing all log. should not be uncritically accepted from the fluctu- natives, ating morality of common sense nor from the commonplaces of the schools, but should be shown to be "alternatives between which the human mind" is "necessarily forced to choose when it attempts to frame a complete synthesis of prac

of this

necessity of

ical alter