but that pleasure is to be got by following evolution. It postulates, therefore, that the progress of life tends, and tends even in a proportionate degree, to the increase of pleasure. Yet we could obtain no proof that this progress does, as a matter of fact, increase pleasure in any regular way. On the contrary, the facts of experience seemed to show that life and pleasure do not advance proportionately, nor even always concomitantly. But a still more important and fundamental objection to the hedonistic form of evolutionism was inferred from the nature of pleasure itself; for it can be modified indefinitely, and always follows in the wake of function. Thus the sole intelligible account we can give of what conduct will bring the greatest pleasure is, that it is the conduct which calls forth the greatest amount of successful energising, that which employs the greatest number and the strongest of the human faculties. Hence, instead of being able to measure life by pleasure, we were driven to interpret pleasure in terms of life. pendent given by the theory At first sight it seemed as if the theory of evolu- No indetion might lead us beyond the pleasure-basis of ethical ideal older Naturalism. But, when the matter was examined more closely, it was found that the of evolution. notions put forward were unsatisfactory, that they did not represent the progressive nature of the course of evolution, and that their apparent force fell away before logical analysis. It became evi dent, in the first place, that no appropriate standard for human conduct could be derived from the nature of evolution in general. It is true that adaptation to environment is necessary for life; but to put forward such adaptation as the moral standard, is to set up a practical goal which corresponds but ill with the facts from which it professes to be taken, making the theory which is supposed to account for progress establish no end by pursuit of which progress becomes possible for human action. Further than this, it neglects a factor in evolution as necessary to it as is adaptation to environment—the element, namely, of variation. A theory which took the latter as well as the former of these factors into account seemed, in the next place, to be given by those general characteristics which are said to mark all progress-increase of definiteness, coherence, and heterogeneity. from these, again, it was found impossible to elicit a coherent and consistent rule for determining right and wrong in conduct, or a definite end for action: they were too abstract and mechanical to suit the living organism of human conduct; and we were thus driven back on the more general statement that 'life' or the 'increase of life' is the end after which we should strive. In enquiring into the . meaning which could be given to this end, without interpreting it as pleasure, it was found, after tracing it through various forms of expression, that But it reduced itself to making a man's strongest and most persistent impulses both standard and end. And this proved to be not only an uncertain and shifting guide for conduct, but an imperfect representation of what was to be expected from a progressive, because evolutionist, theory. For these persistent impulses could only be regarded as the survival of past activities, and consequently, contained no ideal beyond that of continuing in the old paths, and re-treading an already well-beaten course. Just as from the external end of adaptation to environment, so from this internal or subjective principle, no ideal for progress, nor any definite standard for action, could be obtained. (It would appear, therefore, that the theory of evolution—however great its achievements in the realm of natural science-is almost resultless in ethics. It has started with a fundamental ethical assumption, the grounds of which have not been examined, and which has, indeed, been seldom recognised; and as a consequence, in spite of the light which it throws on many practical questions, it has been found unable either to set up a comprehensive ideal for life, or to yield any principle for distinguishing between good and evil in conduct. 310 CHAPTER X. of the relation of evolution to ethics. CONCLUSION. 1. Summary THE preceding chapters have passed in review the various ways in which ethical results may seem to follow from the theory of evolution. The enquiry has been complicated-to a large extent, it has been caused-by a double ambiguity. There are two quite different sets of questions to which the name 'ethical' is commonly applied: and 'evolution' differs in nature according to the factors which it involves. A reference once more to these points may serve the purpose of gathering together the main lines of argument and enforcing the conclusion arrived at. Two distinct kinds of ethical enquiry: The enquiries.commonly described as 'ethical' comprise two kinds of question, which differ fundamentally from one another in scope, and require the employment of distinct methods for their solution. On the one hand there are the facts of human conduct, the customs and institutions to which it gives rise, and the sentiments and ideas by which it is accompanied. All these are facts in time whose genesis and history may ution of tions. as an ex historical continuity. The former class of questions, it is clear, are con- (a) The evol cerned with matters of fact and history. Their moral ideas investigation, it has also been allowed, must be and institu guided by the conception of evolution. But, even here, an important distinction is often overlooked. Evolution is a somewhat vague conception. It may mean nothing more than an assertion of Evolution historical continuity; and, in this sense, it is true pression for that moral conduct institutions and ideas have been evolved. But the term may also have the more defined meaning which owes its prominence in contemporary thought to Darwin's researches into organic development. In this meaning of Evolution the term evolution is defined by its method: it selection. works by natural selection, that is, by the death of those organisms which are unable to maintain themselves in the struggle for life. It postulates individual variety such that one organism is more efficient than another in the struggle, and an environment by natural |