(c) Dependence of ethical on general points of view : worth; and, in the analysis and application of the facts of the moral consciousness, the work of ethical science may have seemed to be completed. But the facts of the moral consciousness, or moral experience, form a part of the wider experience which has to be interpreted by metaphysics: so that no final severance of ethical from metaphysical enquiry is possible. Their close connexion is shown in the history of thought. The Naturalism or Idealism which marks a speculative system determines the character of its ethical doctrine, whilst moralists have been divided into schools by reason of their differences on such questions as the relation of pleasure to desire, or the nature of conscience, which are primarily questions of psychological analysis. And it is not special controversies only that are affected in this way. The scope of ethical science as a whole is differently conceived as the philosophical standpoint changes. Thus, not for one school only, but for a whole period in the history of (a) teleolo- reflexion, ethics was regarded as an enquiry into gical, the highest good. Opposed schools agreed in looking from this point of view, however much they might differ from one another in defining the nature of that highest good. At other times, according to the prevailing view, to investigate and systematise the rules of conduct has exhausted the scope of ethics-controversies being carried on as (B) jural, ical: to the nature of those rules, and their source in external authority or in the internal revelation of conscience. Again, ethical enquiry has been apparently identified with the analysis and history (v) empirof the moral affections and sentiments; while a purely descriptive point of view seems to be sometimes adopted, and ethics held to be an investigation of the motives and results of action, and of the forms, customary and institutional, in which those results find permanent expression. These different ways of looking at the whole subject proceed from points of view whose effects are not confined to ethics, but may be followed out along other lines of investigation. They correspond to ideas which dominate different types of thought, and form different philosophical standpoints. The first starts from a teleological conception of human nature, as an organism consciously striving towards its end. The second assimilates ethics to a system of legal enactments, and is connected with the jural conceptions of theology and law. The two last are concerned to show that the subject-matter of ethics are facts which have to be treated by the ordinary inductive and historical methods. These different points of view, however, may be regarded as complementary rather than as conflicting, although their complete to be consynthesis must be worked out in the region of philosophy. general philosophy, and not on purely ethical nected by (b) Ethics necessary to complete ground. Philosophy has thus to deal with the notions which determine the scope and character of ethical thought; and in this way it must be practical as well as speculative. If it is the business of philosophy to bring into rational order the material supplied by experience, cosmical and anthropological, it cannot be without bearing on the function of man as a source of action in the world. The question, What are the ends man ought to pursue? is not merely as natural as the question, What can a man know of the world and of himself? But the two questions are inseparably connected. To know man is to know him not only as a thinking but also as an active being; while to solve the problem of the ends of man implies knowledge both of his nature and of the sphere of his activity. Whatever may be the difficulty of connecting ethics with metaphysics, it remains true that the philosophy. philosophy - whether metaphysical or not- - in which our most comprehensive view of the world finds its reasoned expression, cannot neglect that aspect of things in which man is related to his surroundings as a source of action. Recent ethical literature is itself a proof of this fact. In its speculative developments, both realistic and idealistic, the philosophy of the present day has made the endeavour to connect its conceptions of the world of thought and nature with the ends con templated as to be realised in the realm of action. The conception of 'reality' is not the same as that of 'goodness' or 'worth'; 'is' does not imply 'ought to be.' But the connexion of the two conceptions has to be investigated not merely in order that human activity may be shown to be rational, but that reason itself may be justified by leaving nothing outside its sphere. We must not, therefore, begin by drawing a line of absolute separation between the first two of the three questions in which, as Kant says,1 all the interests of our reason centre. The 'What ought I to do?' of ethics is for ever falling back on the 'What can I know?' of metaphysics. The question of practice must be treated throughout in connexion with the question of knowledge. If we use Kant's distinction between speculative and practical reason, we must always bear in mind. that it is the same reason which is in one reference speculative, in another practical.2 We are not at liberty to assume with Butler that "morality must be somewhat plain and easy to be understood: it must appeal to what we call commonsense." Nor may we presuppose, as Hutcheson did, that it is a subject "about which a little 1 Werke, ed. Hartenstein (1867), iii. 532. 2 Cf. Kant, Werke, iv. 237. 3 Sermons, v., towards the end. Essay on the Passions and Affections, p. iv. ... 2. The enquiry into end reflection will discover the truth." The question must be looked upon not so much as one of immediate practical as of scientific interest, and reason is to be regarded as the only court of appeal. The form just quoted, in which Kant states the the ethical problem, is not altogether free from ambiguity. 'What ought I to do?' may be taken to signify, What means should I adopt for the attainment of some end presupposed, perhaps unconsciously, as the end to be sought? But it is evident, not only that this is not what Kant himself meant by the question, but that, as thus put, it necessarily implies a further and deeper question. Not the discovery of the means, but the determination of the end itself—the end which cannot be interpreted as a mere means to some further end-is the (a) fundamental, fundamental question of ethics. It is only by misconception that this can be thought to be a trivial question. To say, as a recent scientific writer does, "That happiness in one disguise or another is the end of human life is common ground for all the schools," is either to ignore what the schools have taught, or else to use the word 2 1 W. H. Rolph, Biologische Probleme, zugleich als Versuch zur Entwicklung einer rationellen Ethik, 2nd ed., p. 21. 2 Not to mention Kant, the consistent opponent of every eudæmonistic principle, or the doctrines of a political idealist such as Mazzini (see Life and Writings (1867), iv. 223), reference may be made to W. K. Clifford, who looks from the scientific |