Now, in saying that the most complex adjustments of acts to ends are the highest kinds of conduct, and that we should be guided by the more complex in preference to simpler motives, this obvious difficulty is passed over. It is true that Spencer, in chapters rich in suggestion, and filled with skilfully chosen illustrations, has passed in review the various aspects of conduct according as we look at it from the point of view of the physical environment, of life, of mind, and of society. But, when these different aspects are brought together and compared, it becomes clear that the attempt to judge conduct by reference to the 'fundamental truth' that evolution implies an advance towards greater complexity, must necessarily end in failure.1

produced by

and indi

In the first place, there is a notable discrepancy (a) antinomy between the biological and the sociological aspect. it between For the complete development of the individual the social life implies that every function should be fulfilled, vidual ends; and that its fulfilment should interfere with the performance of no other function. "The performance of every function is, in a sense, a moral obligation." ("The ideally moral man . . . is one in

1 So far as the following criticism may appear to apply to Spencer, and not merely to a possible way of defining moral conduct, it is necessary to bear in mind the words of his preface to the Principles of Ethics: "With a view to clearness, I have treated separately some correlative aspects of conduct, drawing conclusions either of which becomes untrue if divorced from the other."

whom the functions of all kinds are duly fulfilled,” -that is to say, "discharged in degrees duly adjusted to the conditions of existence." A fully evolved life is marked by multiplicity and complexity of function. And, if from the individual we pass to the social organism, we find that the same truth holds. The state, or organised body of individuals, has many functions to perform; but it can only perform them in the most efficient way. through the functions of its individual members being specialised. From the social point of view, therefore, the greatest possible division of labour is a mark of the most evolved and perfect community. And this division of labour implies that each individual, instead of performing every function of which he is capable, should be made to restrict himself to that at which he is best, so that the community may be the gainer from the time and exertion that are saved, and the skill that is produced, by the most economic expenditure of individual talent. Thus social perfection appears to imply a condition of things inconsistent with that development of one's whole nature which, from the biological point of view, has just been defined as a characteristic of the ideally moral man. It seems, indeed, inevitable that any such abstract preliminary notion of development as that which would test it by increase of complexity must fail in such a 1 Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 75 f.

case as this where there is no question between the competing claims of two phenomena on the same level, but where harmony is wanted between the different aspects the same phenomena present when looked at from the point of view of the individual and from the point of view of the whole.

chological

There is still greater difficulty in applying this (8) its psycriterion, when we come to the psychological aspect aspect of morality. According to Spencer, “the acts characterised by the more complex motives and the more involved thoughts, have all along been of higher authority for guidance."1 But the later or more advanced in mental evolution is not always more complex in structure; for it is a characteristic of mental development that the processes by which a result has been arrived at gradually disappear on account of the diminished attention they receive, so that there remains what is, so far as psychical structure is concerned, a simple mental state. Complexity of structure and indirectness of confounds origin are thus really two different characteristics of structure of states of mind, which frequently go together, but with indifrequently part company.2 When Spencer, accord- origin, ingly, goes on to say that "for the better preser

3

1 Principles of Ethics, i. 106.

2 Although Spencer holds that representativeness varies as definiteness, and measures complexity, including the complexity implied by increasing heterogeneity.-Principles of Psychology, ii. 516 f.

3 Principles of Ethics, i. 113.

complexity

rectness of

1 neither of which can

serve as an

ethical standard.

vation of life the primitive simple presentative feelings must be controlled by the later-evolved compound and representative feelings," he is really passing to a different standard without giving up the former. The sympathy with injured Zulus or Afghans so lavishly expressed by Spencer1 may be a more indirect, representative, or re-representative feeling, than the sentiments which led to British expeditions, and, as such, may be more to be commended. But it would be rash to say that sympathy with the 'British interests' supposed to be at stake-interests of commerce, and of the balance of political power, as well as those arising from the subtle effect of national prestige-is less complex than the feeling of sympathy with a people dispossessed of its territory. The latter feeling may be more indirect or representative, as implying an imaginative appropriation of the circumstances of another community; but, so far as structure is concerned, it is composed of far fewer and simpler component elements than the feeling for British interests.

Nor, on the other hand, can we allow ourselves to take refuge in the conclusion that, if the more complex emotion cannot be held to be better - morally, then that which is later in evolution may at least be regarded as of higher authority than the earlier evolved feeling. According to Spencer the 1 Cf. Principles of Sociology, ii. 725.

man who obtains by fraud the money to support his family is to be condemned, because, although we admit the claim his family have upon him, "we regard as of superior authority the feelings which respond to men's proprietary claims-feelings which are re-representative in a higher degree and refer to more remote diffused consequences."1 But, were this the ground of distinction, we ought also to regard the feeling prompting a man to distribute his fortune in any foolish enterprise 'as of superior authority' to those which prompt him to support his family, if only the former are 're-representative in a higher degree,' and their consequences more 'remote' and 'diffused. Many of the greatest evils which infect social life and warp the moral feelings of men are evils which are only possible as the result of a highly advanced civilisation and a refined and delicate organisation of the mind. The factitious sentiments raised by a subtle casuistry with the effect of confusing the ordinary distinctions of right and wrong are, in almost all cases, more indirect and re-representative than the feelings in harmony with the moral consciousness of the community which they set aside in the individual conscience. So obvious, indeed, are objections of this kind-objections, that is to say, taken from the impossibility of so applying the criterion as to construct a workable system of 1 Principles of Ethics, i. 123.