subsequent results. If we continue to look from the evolutionist point of view, the question, What conduct will on the whole bring most pleasure? only leads us back to the question, What conduct will most promote life? And it was to give meaning to this conception 'promotion of life' that it was interpreted in terms of greatest pleasure. The evolution-theory of ethics is thus seen to oscillate between the theory which looks upon the summum bonum as pleasure, and the theory which finds it in activity. But it contains elements which make it impossible for it to adhere to the former alternative. The comprehensiveness of its view of life makes it unable to adopt pleasure as the end, since pleasure changes with every modification of function. And it has now to be seen whether the empirical method of interpretation to which it adheres will allow of its notion of life or activity affording a satisfactory end for conduct, or any standard of moral worth. 243 CHAPTER IX. THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. mony be hedonism. IN showing the important bearing which evolution Want of har has on the causes of pleasure, the argument of the tween evolupreceding chapter has also made clear that the ends tionism and of evolutionism and of hedonism cannot be made to explain one another. The theory which starts with a maximum of pleasure as the ultimate end, but points to the course of evolution as showing how that end is to be realised, is confronted by the fact that the development of life does not always tend to increased pleasure, and that the laws of its development cannot therefore be safely adopted as maxims for the attainment of pleasure. The same objection may be taken to the method of interpreting the evolutionist standard by means of the pleasurable results of conduct. The two do not correspond with that exactness which would admit of one doing duty for the other as a practical guide. And a further difficulty has been shown to stand Necessity of investigat dent contri bution of evolution to ethics. in the way of this method. For, on coming to analyse pleasure, we find that it may, by habituation, arise from any or almost any course of conduct which is consistent with the conditions of existence. The evolutionist, therefore, can have no surer idea of greatest pleasure—even although this may not be a very sure one-than that it will follow in the train of the greatest or most varied activity which harmonises with the laws of life. We must therefore forsake the method of eclecing indepen- ticism, and enquire whether the theory of evolution can make any independent contribution towards determining either an ideal for conduct or a standard for distinguishing between right and wrong. We are frequently told that it prescribes as the end 'preservation,' or 'development,' or 'the health of the society.' But to obtain a clear meaning for such notions, we must see what definite content the theory of evolution can give them,-without considering, at present, the grounds for transforming them into ethical precepts. Now, it may be thought and the suggestion deserves careful examination—that we may find in the characteristics of evolution itself 2 an indication of the end which 1 Cf. below, pp. 282, 320 ff. 2 Taking evolution in its widest sense, since the theory of evolution does not "imply some intrinsic proclivity in every species towards a higher form.”—Spencer, First Principles, App. p. 574; Principles of Sociology, i. 106. organisms produced by and subject to evolution are naturally fitted to attain. These characteristics must therefore be passed under review, that their ethical bearings may be seen. tion to en necessary 1. The first condition of development, and even 1. Adaptaof life, is correspondence between an organism and vironment: its environment. The waste implied in the pro- for life; cesses which constitute the life of an organised body has to be supplied by nutriment got from surrounding objects. It requires food, air, light, and heat in due proportions in order that its various organs may do their work. When these circumstances change, either it adapts itself to the new conditions or death ensues. Thus "we find that every animal is limited to a certain range of climate; every plant to certain zones of latitude and elevation," 1-though nothing differs more among different species than the extent of an organism's adaptability to varying conditions. A definite organism and a medium suitable to it are called byComte the two "fundamental correlative conditions of life"; according to Spencer they constitute life. "Conformity" is absolutely necessary between "the vital functions of any organism and the conditions in which it is placed." In this conformity there are varying degrees, and "the completeness of the life will be proportionate to the completeness 1 Spencer, Principles of Biology, i. 73. spoken of as the ethical end; of the correspondence."1 Even when life is not altogether extinguished, it is impeded by imperfect adaptation. Where external circumstances make the attainment of nourishment difficult and precarious, life is shortened in extent, and, within its limits, more occupied with simply maintaining its necessary functions-less full, varied, and active. The same holds good whether the external circumstances are natural or social,-applies equally to those whose energies are exhausted in the production of a bare livelihood from a niggard soil and unpropitious climate, and to those who, under changed conditions, feel the hardship of adapting themselves to a new social medium. Shall we say, then, that the end of human conduct is adaptation to environment? This seems to be the position taken up by some evolutionists. In the language of von Baer,2 "the end of ends is always that the organic body be adapted to the conditions of the earth, its elements and means of nutriment"; and Spencer has said "that all evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to condition." 3 The hedonism which Spencer definitely accepted as his ethical principle prevented him, indeed, from fully adopting the theory of human action which von Baer seemed to put forward as the result of the doctrine of evolution. 1 Spencer, Principles of Biology, i. 82. 3 Social Statics (1850), p. 77. |