satisfaction of will. But it does not do to regard the pleasure as altogether indirect when, although the cessation of a pain is necessary for its production, it is itself something more than this cessation. The inhibition of will often prevents the realisation of an object which is very much more than a recompense in pleasurable quality for the pain of the restraint; and, although the pleasure only arises when this painful state of inhibition is removed, it brings a direct and positive gain over and above the gratification of the cessation of the pain. In the third place, Hartmann argues that the satisfaction of will is often unconscious, whereas pain is eo ipso conscious. But, even admitting the reality of unconscious will or desire, which this argument involves, it does not follow that pleasure and pain are differently affected in regard to it. If pain is eo ipso conscious, so also is pleasure; if the satisfaction of unconscious desire gives no pleasure, neither does the absence of such satisfaction give pain. It is true, as Hartmann adds in the fourth place, that desire is often long and the joy of satisfaction fleeting; but this holds not so much of mental pleasures as of those connected with physical appetite. Of them it is true that "These violent delights have violent ends, And in their triumph die."

1

But in the higher pleasures with more permanent 1 Cf. Sully, Pessimism, p. 226 n.

objects of pursuit, although the desire may be longcontinued, the pleasure does not disappear in the moment of gratification.

It would seem, therefore, that the pessimist psychology, in treating pleasure in a different way from. pain, mistakes the true nature of both, and prevents the argument from being faced which has been brought forward to show the increasing correspondence of pleasure and life.

of human

The failure of the psychological argument makes (cc) the facts the whole burden of the proof of pessimism rest progress: upon the argument from historical facts. And the attempt has been definitely made to show, from observation of the course of human affairs, that the progress of the world tends to misery. It is necessary, therefore, to ask whether it can be established that the facts included under the vague term 'human progress' have a normal tendency either to increase pleasure or to act in the opposite way. Now progress is a characteristic both of the individual and of society; but pleasure only belongs to the former, so that an answer to the question whether individual progress tends to increase the surplus of pleasure over pain, still leaves unsettled the question as to the effect of social progress.

It seems evident that both the physical and individual mental development of the individual imply greater

progress;

adaptability to and correspondence with, the external world, and that, on account of this development, there is less unpleasant friction between outer and inner relations, and means are at hand for obtaining objects of desire with less exertion than formerly. But, at the same time, the increase of knowledge and of skill always implies not merely the means of satisfying old wants, but the creation of new ones: we see more of the evil in the world than our forefathers did, and there are more avenues by which it can approach us, if we have also more effective means for avoiding what we dislike. Further, the widening of the sympathetic feelings and their consequent activities, and the refinement of the whole sensitive nature by which it responds more quickly and accurately to emotional stimuli, have made the present generation more susceptible to both pain and pleasure than its predecessors. But Hartmann's argument that the duller nervous system of the savage races (Naturvölker) makes them happier than the civilised (Culturvölker),1 leaves out of sight the new sources of pleasure as well as pain that are opened up to a refined sensibility. According to Hartmann, the aesthetic sensibilities may be a source of painless pleasure: yet even their cultivation cannot be said to be matter of pure gain to their possessors; for the pain of discord is to be set against-in his opinion, it out1 Phil. d. Unbewussten, p. 747.

weighs the pleasure of harmony. On the whole, then, it would appear that the evolution of the individual leads to greater possibilities both of pleasure and of pain. The refinement of the intellectual and the emotional nature opens up wider ranges of both kinds of feeling; but it seems impossible to arrive at a quite confident and objective judgment as to its tendency; and we are driven to look mainly to the improvement of the social environment for the means of increasing pleasure and diminishing pain.

gress:

But to estimate the hedonistic value of social social proprogress is a still more difficult task than the preceding. For the march of affairs often appears to have little regard to its effect on the happiness of the greater number of people concerned. Industri- industrial, ally, it may be thought that the increase in the amount of wealth produced affords a vastly greater means of comfort and luxury. Yet, it is doubtful whether this increase has always been sufficient to keep pace with the growth of population; and it is certain that every society whose territory is limited, must, when its numbers have increased beyond a certain point, begin to experience the diminishing returns which nature yields for the labour expended upon it. And, even although the average quantity of wealth be greater now than it has been, it must be remembered that wealth is measured by its amount, whereas happiness depends on the equality

Р

Iwith which that amount is distributed.1 Yet the present industrial régime tends to the accumulation of immense wealth in a few hands, rather than to its proportionate increase throughout the community. The industrial progress which increases the wealth of the rich, has little to recommend it if it leaves the 'labouring poor' at a starvationwage.

"And what if Trade sow cities

Like shells along the shore,

And thatch with towns the prairie broad
With railways ironed o'er ?"—

if the population can be divided into plutocrats and proletariate. Moreover, the very nature of economic production may seem to imply an opposition between social progress and individual wellbeing. For the former, in demanding the greatest possible amount of produce, requires an excessive and increasing specialisation of labour. Each worker

1 Bentham, Theory of Legislation (by Dumont, 1876), p. 103 ff. Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, 5th ed., ii. 317, finds in this an instance of Weber's law. Thus, the man with £100 receives the same pleasure on receipt of £1, as the possessor of £1000 does on receiving £10. As Wundt remarks, however, this is only true within certain limits. Sixpence may give more pleasure to a beggar who is never far from the starvation-point, than the clearing of a million to Baron Rothschild. Further than this, the law only states an 'abstract' truth. For the susceptibility to pleasure is not only very different in different individuals, but this difference depends on many other circumstances than the amount of wealth already in possession,—such as original emotional susceptibility, &c.